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The purpose of this thesis was to evaluate a new network management solution
offered by the YANG data modelling language and the NETCONF network man-
agement protocol. The evaluation set out to answer the question if this network
management solution is an efficient, secure and reliable way to dynamically man-
age networks. In addition, the new emerging network paradigms Software Defined
Networking (SDN) and Network Function Virtualization (NFV) were examined to
understand how this new network management solution relates to them.
The fundamental network management capabilities of network management so-
lutions were examined for the purposes of the evaluation. The used source material
included specifications of many network management protocols and research papers
related to the field of network management. Moreover, a new YANG model was
modelled and a prototype NETCONF server was implemented. The model was
done to get a more in depth view of the data modelling process. Whilst, the server
was examined to get an understanding of the server’s internals and implementa-
tion details. The gathered information was used to evaluate the suitability of this
new network management solution for the use of SDN and NFV. Furthermore, this
new network management solution was analysed based on its strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities and threats.
In the evaluation it was observed that this new network management solution
is substantially better for network configuration compared to the other solutions.
However, it was observed that for network monitoring this new network manage-
ment solution does not offer the same level of efficiency as some of the other so-
lutions. In addition, this new network management solution was found to offer a
more sophisticated and versatile information security and user management con-
trols than the other solutions. The analysis showed that the strengths of this new
network management solution were open interface, extendibility, security, reliability
and performance, whilst the weaknesses of it were resource consumption and low
utilization.
The conclusion of this evaluation was that this new network management solution
does offer an efficient, secure and reliable way to dynamically manage networks.
However, many of the other network management solutions are still seen as useful
solutions in their own limited areas.
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Ta¨ma¨n diplomityo¨n tarkoituksena oli arvioida YANG-tietomallinuskielen ja
NETCONF-verkonhallintaprotokollan tarjoamaa uutta verkonhallintaratkaisua. Ar-
vioinnissa pyrittiin vastamaan siihen, onko ta¨ma¨ uusi verkonhallintaratkaisu teho-
kas, turvallinen ja luotettava tapa hallita tietoverkkoja dynaamisesti. Lisa¨ksi tyo¨ssa¨
selvitettiin, miten ta¨ma¨ uusi verkonhallintaratkaisu suhtautuu uusiin tietoverkkojen
toteutustapoihin Software Defined Networking (SDN) ja Network Function Virtua-
lization (NFV).
Arviointia varten tyo¨ssa¨ tarkasteltiin verkonhallinan kannalta keskeisia¨ ominai-
suuksia. La¨hdeaineistoon kuului verkonhallintaprotokollien ma¨a¨rittelydokumentte-
ja ja aiheeseen liittyvia¨ artikkeleita. Kirjallisen selvityksen lisa¨ksi arviointia var-
ten mallinnettiin uusi YANG-tietomalli seka¨ toteutettiin prototyyppi NETCONF-
palvelimesta. Tietomallia ja sen mallinnuksessa ka¨ytettya¨ prosessia ka¨ytiin la¨pi, jot-
ta saatiin tarkempi na¨kemys tietomallinnuksen yksityiskohdista. Palvelinta ja sen
sisa¨ista¨ rakennetta avattiin, jotta pystyttiin tarkemmin selvitta¨ma¨a¨n palvelintoteu-
tuksen yksityiskohtia. Kera¨tyn aineiston pohjalta arvioitiin ta¨ma¨n uuden verkon-
hallintaratkaisun soveltuvuutta SDN:n ja NFV:n ka¨ytto¨o¨n. Lisa¨ksi ta¨ta¨ uutta ver-
konhallintaratkaisua analysoitiin esitta¨ma¨lla¨ kera¨tysta¨ aineistosta sen ka¨ytto¨o¨noton
vahvuudet, heikkoudet, mahdollisuudet ja uhat.
Arvioitaessa ta¨ta¨ uutta verkonhallintaratkaisua havaittiin, etta¨ se tarjoaa huo-
mattavasti muita ka¨siteltyja¨ ratkaisuja paremmat la¨hto¨kohdat tietoverkkojen ase-
tusten dynaamiseen muokkaamiseen, mutta osittain heikommat la¨hto¨kohdat tieto-
verkkojen tilan valvontaan. Lisa¨ksi ta¨ma¨n uuden verkonhallintaratkaisun tietoturva
ja ka¨ytta¨ja¨hallinta na¨htiin muita ka¨siteltyja¨ ratkaisuja kehittyneemma¨ksi ja mo-
nipuolisemmaksi. Ta¨ma¨n uuden verkonhallintaratkaisun vahvuuksiksi na¨htiin sen
avoin rajapinta, laajennettavuus, turvallisuus, luotettavuus ja suorityskyky. Heik-
kouksiksi na¨htiin resurssien ka¨ytto¨ ja alhainen ka¨ytto¨aste.
Arvioinnin tuloksena pa¨a¨dyttiin siihen, etta¨ ta¨ma¨ uusi verkonhallintaratkaisu tar-
joaa tehokkaan, turvallisen ja luotettavan tavan hallita tietoverkkoja dynaamisesti.
Muut verkonhallintaratkaisut na¨htiin kuitenkin edelleen hyo¨dyllisiksi omissa raja-
tummissa ka¨ytto¨tarkoituksissaan.
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vLIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS
API Application Programming Interface is a service description that de-
fines how to call a set of operations and how those operations re-
spond. APIs are used to abstract implementation details and thus
allow different implementations be accessed in a unified way.
CLI Command Line Interface is a primitive user interface used to pro-
vide a set of commands to manage a device.
DSL Domain Specific Language is a language designed for a specific ap-
plication domain to express it more clearly than any existing lan-
guage.
ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute is an European
standardation organization focused on telecommunications field.
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force is an open standardation organi-
zation that develops Internet Standards.
IKEv2 Internet Key Exchange version 2 is a reimplementation of the IKE
protocol. IKEv2 brought a number of changes to the IKE speci-
fication and unified the wide spread of RFCs under a single more
consistent document.
IPC Inter-Process Communication is a communication mechanism for
two or more processes to share data with each other.
IPsec Internet Protocol security defines two protocols, Authentication
Header (AH) and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), which are
used respectively to provide integrity and authenticity or integrity,
authenticity and confidentiality for internet traffic. IKE is used for
automatic keying of IPsec, but it can also be managed manually.
NACM NETCONF Access Control Model is an access list based mechanism
used to limit the allowed actions of the NETCONF protocol users.
NF Network Function can describe any network element like a switch,
a router or a middlebox that performs some network operations.
NFV Network Function Virtualization focuses on virtualizing network
resources, referred as functions, and creating network services by
connecting and chaining these functions together. Reducing net-
work maintenance costs is a major driver for NFV.
NETCONF Network Configuration Protocol is an IETF stantardized protocol
used to manage network devices.
RFC Request for Comments is a technical document published by the In-
ternet Engineering Task Force. RFCs specify many of the protocols
and practices used in the Internet.
List of symbols and abbreviations vi
RPC Remote Procedure Call is an invocation of operation that is exe-
cuted in an external process, usually on another machine. RPCs
are a form of IPC.
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol is an IETF stantardized pro-
tocol used mainly to monitor network devices, although the protocol
also supports management features.
SDN Software Defined Networking focuses on allowing a programmable
access to network nodes and and delegating the decision making to
an external entity, thus allowing to separate the data plane (packet
forwarding) from the control plane (routing logic).
SMIv2 Structure of Management Information Version 2 is a modelling
language defined for the SNMP protocol and it closely relates to the
YANG modelling language. SMIv2 is used to define Management
Information Base (MIB) modules.
SSH Secure Shell is a cryptographic protocol designed to secure network
communications. SSH is mainly used to provide secure remote ac-
cess.
TLS Transport Layer Security is a cryptographic protocol designed to
secure network communications. TLS is mostly used to provide a
secure channel between two applications.
VNF Virtual Network Function can describe any virtualized network el-
ement like a switch, a router or a middlebox that performs some
network operations.
YANG Yet Another Next Generation is a data modelling language for the
NETCONF protocol. YANG is used to provide a management API
for network devices.
1 INTRODUCTION
Network management is relatively simple when the networks being managed are
small, consisting of maybe five to ten different network functions (NF). However,
the network management becomes increasingly complex when the NF counts go up.
In 2012, Sherry et al. conducted a survey on network deployments across enterprises
of varying size and found out that the networks contained substantial amounts of
middleboxes and Layer 3 (L3) routers, with the average network ranging from 17 on
small to 4800 on large enterprises [1]. A typical L3 router or a middlebox contains
multiple NFs, for example a router could contain NFs such as NTP and DHCP
servers in addition to the routing functionality. The survey also found out that
network management personnel required to manage these networks ranged from
few on small enterprises to hundreds on large enterprises [1]. Furthermore, the
network management complexities got underlined when most of the administrators
in the survey (˜62%) estimated misconfiguration to be the most common cause for
network failures on middlebox deployments [1]. Two other studies conducted in 2003
by Oppenheimer et al. [2] and 2004 by Kerravala [3] also conclude that the number
one reason for network outages is human error. In addition, Kerravala’s study notes
that 80% of enterprise IT budgets is spent on maintaining the status quo, leaving
only scraps for new developments [3].
This thesis explores how network management could be made less error-prone by
using the network management protocol NETCONF and its data modelling language
YANG. The NETCONF protocol offers programmatic access to the managed NFs
that can be used to achieve automated network management solutions that control
network dynamically and efficiently. Furthermore, the thesis focuses on evaluating
this approach compared to the existing network management solutions.
The thesis starts by exploring and explaining the different aspects of network
management which involve mainly configuration and monitoring. These aspects are
sometimes combined in programs called network management systems. In addition,
the new emerging network paradigms Software Defined Networking (SDN) and Net-
work Function Virtualization (NFV) are briefly explored since the YANG modelling
language and the NETCONF protocol both serve as enablers for both technologies in
some degree. After the introduction to network management, the concepts of YANG
and NETCONF are discussed in their own chapters. With the basis laid out, the
thesis moves on to give some insight on the how to use YANG and NETCONF to
actually integrate into existing systems. In addition, a prototype NETCONF server
implementation made for the purposes of this thesis is presented and its details are
discussed. Finally, the theory and prototypes are used to evaluate the network man-
agement capabilities of YANG and NETCONF. In the evaluation the focus is on
what are the strengths and weaknesses of using YANG and NETCONF and what
are the offered opportunities and foreseeable threats.
2 NETWORK MANAGEMENT
There are plethora of different kinds of networks, ranging from small home networks
through enterprise intranets and extranets to wide area networks operated by service
providers. These networks have very different needs for their network management
requirements. Small home networks consisting of few devices require low manage-
ment overhead and can often be most efficiently controlled manually, whereas larger
networks from ten to few hundred devices require already quite systematic approach
to cope with the complexities that rise from the sheer size of such networks. As the
network grows larger it becomes apparent that a management solution is required
to help administrators to cope with the complex structure.
Virtualization has provided network administrators cost effective solution to seg-
ment the network in different layers of the OSI model. On data link layer came
the first network virtualization solutions in the form of virtual local area networks
(VLANs). With VLANs administrators could get the same functionality of network
segmentation with a fraction of the devices earlier required. On network layer then
came virtual routing and forwarding (VRF) that allowed administrators to segment
the IP networks. With VRFs administrators could serve multiple networks again
with a fraction of the devices earlier required. And now we are in the advent of full
blown virtualization where almost all of the elements in the network support virtu-
alization as virtual machines that virtualize all of the layers in the OSI model. The
increased use of virtualization has cumulated into huge amount of functionality in
the network that administrators have to cope with. Whilst the amount of physical
devices has diminished, the network segmentation and complexity has increased.
In this chapter a thorough look into the network management is given. The
network management consists of fault, configuration, accounting, performance and
security (FCAPS) management as standardized by the International Organization
for Standardization (ISO) [4], also referred to as OSI network management model,
which in this thesis are roughly merged into two categories: configuration and mon-
itoring. Furthermore, the concepts of SDN and NFV are discussed.
2.1 Network Function (NF)
Network Function (NF) is a term used a lot in marketing materials and white papers
dealing with the newest network management paradigms. However, NF is a very
poorly defined term. Most of the papers pass on the definition altogether and others
give vague descriptions such as ”Network Function (NF): functional block within
a network infrastructure that has well-defined external interfaces and well-defined
functional behaviour” [5], which is understandable in that NF could potentially
mean any kind of functionality in network, but for the purposes of this thesis a more
concrete and detailed definition, specific to IP-based networks, is given:
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Network Function (NF) is a hardware or software component, part
of a network device, that implements one specific functionality. One
network device can hold multiple NFs within. A typical NF requires at
least connectivity at physical and data link layers in order to function
properly. Examples of a NFs are MAC filters, OSPF instances, IPsec
gateways and HTTP proxies.
Even the simplest NFs have some basic requirements for their execution envi-
ronment. NFs functioning on data link layer usually do not require anything but
a platform capable of sending and receiving messages from a given medium. NFs
at network layer usually require IP connectivity and possibility to configure the IP-
layer, thus they at minimum require addressing and static routing functionalities.
In addition, common functionalities that can be taken as granted in NFs include
network services such as Network Time Protocol (NTP) and Domain Name System
(DNS) clients. These common functionalities are not considered in this thesis as
individual NFs, but rather as a single underlying NF referred to as system.
In some cases multiple NFs must be chained inside a single execution environment
to fulfil required functionalities. Border gateway is an example of such functionality
because it might be required to speak Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP) to some links
and Exterior Gateway Protocol (EGP) to some other links and these functionalities
can not be separated to different machines. Another example is Protocol Indepen-
dent Multicast Sparse Mode (PIM-SM) router that might require some IGP protocol
to figure out the network layout. However, even if two or more NFs must be bound
together, they still count as multiple NFs rather than one. Furthermore, it is very
common in network devices to bundle tens of NFs into one platform, but this could
change in the future with the advent of NFV.
2.2 Network Configuration
The OSI network management model splits network management into five distinct
functional areas, namely into fault, configuration, accounting, performance and se-
curity management [4]. This thesis bundles these into two categories of which the
first is network configuration. Network configuration in this thesis is considered as
the process of altering the NFs’ internal configurations. Network configuration is
related to the five areas defined in OSI network management model as follows:
Fault management requires network configuration in order to correct the faults
in the network.
Configuration management as a whole is part of the network configuration from
the initialization through the operation until the termination of the NFs.
Accounting management requires network configuration in order to set the ac-
counting limits.
Performance management requires network configuration in order to alter the
network to offer better resource utilization based on the performance manage-
ment activities.
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Security management can be considered as a sensitive configuration manage-
ment and thus relates to network configuration the same way as configuration
management.
Network configuration is an error-prone task as found out by Sherry et al. [1]
and it becomes increasingly more difficult as network sizes grow. Automated con-
figuration generation could potentially help on this matter as the chance of human
errors is reduced, granted that the automation works correctly. Another problem
faced in network configuration is scalability as the amount of management data and
NFs grows [6].
There are multiple ways to configure network elements available to administrators,
three of which are configuration files, Command Line Interface (CLI) and Simple
Network Management Protocol (SNMP). In this section we explore the characteris-
tics of each one individually. In addition, a couple of different proprietary solutions
for network configuration are briefly discussed at the end of this section.
2.2.1 Configuration Files
The most prevalent way on configuring NFs running on open source operating sys-
tems is configuration files. Configuration files usually employ a domain specific
language (DSL) that is used to describe the configuration in format that is close to
the implementation details of the given program that is being configured. Examples
of these DSLs include custom syntaxes such in Figure 2.1 and more generic solutions
such as JSON or INI files. The program that is configured using configuration files
reads the configuration at start up and sometimes has a command or signal to reload
the configuration as necessary at runtime.
listen on 192.168.0.1
servers fi.pool.ntp.org weight 1
Figure 2.1: Example of NTP server configuration file
Usually open source network elements deploy from few to dozens of different
programs that all require their specific kind of configuration files and it is rare
that any two programs would share common configuration model or syntax. For
administrators this approach weighs quite a burden because each element in the
network requires its own local configuration files in their own syntax. The problem
is further amplified with virtualization where each virtual instance requires its own
set of configuration files.
The benefit of configuration files is that they usually very closely resemble the
internal information structure of the programs and they are easy for the developers
to understand since they themselves create the syntax. Because the configuration
files are located in local filesystem of the network elements, modifications to them
usually require remote filesystem access. Thus, configuration files are very static in
nature and incapable of dynamic changes if the network around them is modified.
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2.2.2 Command Line Interface
CLIs are the most common approach to allow network configuration in enterprise
grade networking devices. This approach is taken by many network equipment
companies, although these companies also usually allow some other configuration
interfaces for their devices. CLIs are just frontends for the administrators and their
internal implementation could be very different between different vendors and even
between a vendor’s own devices [6]. The CLI can use an internal API to dynamically
change logic of the network functions or it could transform the CLI commands to an
internal configuration file and then reload the configuration when the administrator
is done editing through the CLI. An example of a CLI transaction is shown in Figure
2.2.
> configure terminal
#> ntp server fi.pool.ntp.org
#> access-list ntp-accesslist permit ip 192.168.0.1 0.0.0.0
#> access-list ntp-accesslist deny ip any any
#> ntp access-group query-only ntp-accesslist
#> !
Figure 2.2: Example of NTP server CLI transaction
CLIs impose the same burden as configuration files to the administrators since
there is no unified CLI that every device supports and the CLI commands can vary
drastically even between vendor’s own CLI implementations. This leads to adminis-
trators needing to learn a number of different CLIs to configure their whole network.
However, CLIs can offer somewhat more dynamic modifications compared to con-
figuration files and thus can be programmed, although with difficulty, to respond to
dynamic modifications of network around them. [6]
2.2.3 Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
SNMP is a network configuration and monitoring protocol standardized first time
in 1988 by IETF. SNMP is a UDP based protocol client-server protocol where the
device in client role that is managing the NFs is called manager and the NFs being
managed are called agents. SNMP’s network management capabilities are repre-
sented in Management Information Base (MIB) modules that are used to expose
agents ’ management data to the manager. By knowing MIB modules that expose
the agent ’s configuration data via SNMP to the manager, the manager could dy-
namically alter the agent ’s configuration. [7][8]
Using SNMP to manage network configuration has mostly been an academic
endeavour [9] rather than one of practical deployments [6]. Reasons that have dis-
couraged the use of SNMP are the fact that SNMP did not support authentication
of the manager until the release of version 3 [10] in 1999 and that SNMP lacks
the support for more complex configuration manipulation capabilities such as easy
retrieval and playback of configurations [6]. But even more prevalent reason why
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SNMP is not used for configuration is the lack of standardized MIB modules that
could be used to configure NFs [6].
2.2.4 Other Approaches
Other approaches for the network management include web page based solutions that
enable the administrator to modify the device with a graphical presentation of the
device’s capabilities, which is considered more user friendly but more limiting and
management application hostile than CLIs [6]. Also some devices offer a proprietary
protocol to configure the devices configuration. Usually these solutions employ some
sort of transformation from the frontend presentation to the backend configuration,
which is usually configuration files on open source solutions.
These solutions are all very specific to a single device or device family and usually
do not even try to be compatible with each other. These solutions also weigh burden
for the administrators since each solution requires them to learn yet another way to
configure the NFs. [6]
2.3 Network Monitoring
As noted earlier, the OSI network management model splits network management
into FCAPS areas and this thesis bundles these into two categories of which the
second is network monitoring [4]. Network monitoring in this thesis is considered as
the process of supervising the NFs’ internal state. Network monitoring is related to
the FCAPS areas as follows:
Fault management requires active fault detection capabilities that can be achieved
with network monitoring.
Configuration management requires network monitoring to collect information
of the current network state and to receive notifications of significant changes
in the network.
Accounting management requires network monitoring in order to keep track of
resource consumption.
Performance management requires the gathering of statistical data and history
of the network utilization via network monitoring.
Security management requires network monitoring to receive reports of security
related events.
Therefore, network monitoring includes keeping a near real-time view of the state
of the network so that administrators can react to problems and see the utilization
of the network. There are multiple solutions available for administrators to monitor
network elements, three of which are logging, SNMP and IP Flow Information Ex-
port (IPFIX). Each of these solutions offer different set of functionalities to expose
the network state. In this section we explore the characteristics of each one individ-
ually. In addition, a couple of different proprietary solutions for network monitoring
are briefly discussed at the end of this section.
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2.3.1 Logging
A very common way for NFs to communicate their state changes and other important
events such as security incidents is logging. A widely used protocol for sending log
messages to remote systems is the syslog protocol which is an IETF standardized
protocol that defines the message header and some of the formatting rules when
serializing messages [11]. However, the syslog protocol does not force any format
which the syslog messages must use, although there has been an attempt to define
common format for log messages using structured data in the standard [11].
The syslog protocol can be enhanced with TLS and RELP1 protocols to offer
security and reliability. However, only some implementations and deployments sup-
port these advanced protocols leaving the UDP based syslog protocol as the most
commonly used way of delivering log messages to remote servers. The problem with
UDP, and to some extent TCP2, in conjunction with network monitoring is unre-
liability which might cause the system monitoring the network to miss important
events [11].
Logging free form messages using protocols such as syslog to remote servers for
persistent storing is a common practise, but sometimes these messages are also
parsed to gather more detailed information of the network state [12]. An example of
a syslog message can be seen in Figure 2.3. The upside of this approach is that, as
logging is de-facto way of noting state changes for many programs, most of the state
changes can be monitored. However, the downside of this approach is the fact that
the messages are usually free form and thus highly implementation specific which
makes them hard to parse and prone to constant changes as the NFs are developed
further. Furthermore, it could be argued that logging was not designed for active
network monitoring, but rather for storing records of past events.
<14>Jan 4 13:30:20 bob ntpd[7714]: adjusting local clock by 8.044731s
Figure 2.3: Example of log message sent by NTP server
2.3.2 Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
SNMP was presented earlier in the network configuration section, but it also offers
network monitoring capabilities. As noted earlier, using SNMP for configuring de-
vices has not been a common practice, however monitoring devices with SNMP has
been the de-facto standard almost since its publication [9]. The vast majority of
MIB modules standardized for SNMP deal with NFs’ state information and even
custom vendor specific MIBs have been created [6].
In addition to the manager -agent type of communication, SNMP offers network
monitoring mechanisms called traps and notifications that can be used to push
lightweight event notifications to the manager asynchronously. SNMP traps are
1The Reliable Event Logging Protocol. Available at: http://www.rsyslog.com/doc/relp.
html. Accessed 10.02.2016
2On the (un)reliability of plain tcp syslog... Available at: http://blog.gerhards.net/2008/
04/on-unreliability-of-plain-tcp-syslog.html. Accessed 10.02.2016
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used in network monitoring systems to receive error and failure notifications from
the NFs [12]. Open source examples of network monitoring systems include Nagios3
and Zabbix4 which use extensively SNMP to query state information and to receive
notifications. An example of SNMP state query on Linux machine is shown in Figure
2.4.
#> snmpwalk -c public -v 2c localhost ifName
IF-MIB::ifName.1 = STRING: lo
IF-MIB::ifName.2 = STRING: eth0
IF-MIB::ifName.3 = STRING: eth1
IF-MIB::ifName.4 = STRING: eth2
Figure 2.4: Example of SNMP query of local interface names
Since SNMP can access quite detailed information of the NF’s internal state,
depending on the MIBs installed to the device, it was eventually standardized to
include authentication with the third revision of the protocol (SNMPv3) which,
although being much more secure protocol, has not completely replaced its earlier
unauthenticated version (SNMPv2c).
2.3.3 IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX)
IPFIX is an IETF standardized network monitoring protocol used to export IP flow
information from NFs [13]. The protocol defines the format which is to be used
when transmitting the flow information and it also defines the method of trans-
portation. The protocol defines exporters and collectors where the exporters gather
flow information from the network and send it to one or more collectors. An exam-
ple of simplified message contents sent in IPFIX messages can be seen in Table 2.1,
which shows two sets of messages received one minute apart reporting the amount
of packets that have been received since the last report. In addition, the IPFIX
standard specifies a method to implement custom data types and ordering in the
protocol messages thus allowing customization of the protocol to fit for different
network monitoring needs [13].
Table 2.1: Example of IPFIX messages containing flow information
Timestamp Source Target Packet Delta
2016-01-02 12:30:12 172.16.1.1 192.168.1.1 30
2016-01-02 12:30:12 172.16.1.1 192.168.2.1 245
2016-01-02 12:30:12 172.16.1.1 192.168.3.1 3
2016-01-02 12:31:12 172.16.1.1 192.168.1.1 700
2016-01-02 12:31:12 172.16.1.1 192.168.2.1 32
2016-01-02 12:31:12 172.16.1.1 192.168.3.1 1
3A monitoring system. Available at: https://www.nagios.org/. Accessed 01.04.2016
4A monitoring solution. Available at: http://www.zabbix.com/. Accessed 01.04.2016
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IPFIX is a binary protocol designed to conserve bytes on the wire and can be
considered a very lightweight protocol. In addition of being lightweight, IPFIX also
employs so called push mechanism so that collector does not need to actively poll
the exporter for information, but rather it receives updates as packets flow in the
network. IPFIX supports SCTP, TCP and UDP as transport protocols which can
be secured by using TLS protocol with mutual authentication between the exporter
and the collector. [13]
2.3.4 Other Approaches
The other approaches at network monitoring include utilities such as small programs
and scripts that are run on the NFs to gather information of the NF’s state. These
utilities then export the gathered information using either output files with spe-
cialized file formats or custom communication protocols. Monitoring utilities such
as these usually offer very detailed view of the monitored NF, but do not output
any easily processable data and are usually rather slow and thus not applicable for
continuous real-time monitoring of the network [6].
Also different kinds of packet sniffers and bump-on-the-wire devices are used to
gather performance statistics from the network. However, such solutions could effi-
ciently be replaced by use of advanced standardized protocols such as IPFIX without
introducing new network elements. There are also some custom network monitor-
ing solutions specialized in security monitoring, which actively scan the network for
open ports and services.
2.4 Software Defined Networking (SDN)
SDN proposes a network management architecture that decouples the control plane
containing the network logic from the data plane that forwards the packets in the
network. This approach allows the network control logic to evolve as independent
software that is not bound to specific hardware platform. The decoupled control
approach allows programmability, automation and network control in greater extent
than before. SDN has become a widely used term in recent years especially after
publication of Open Networking Foundation’s (ONF) SDN white paper in 2012.
However, the origins of SDN and programmable network concepts date back to 1996
to the specification of General Switch Management Protocol (GSMP) [14] that first
proposed the separation of control and data plane [15]. [16]
The steady evolution of network management paradigms and their implications
to control and data planes is visualized in Figure 2.5. The figure shows some of the
protocols that contributed to the evolution of both planes along the years. The data
plane was revolutionized in the advent of network routing protocols such as the early
Gateway-to-Gateway Protocol (GGP) and the Router Information Protocol (RIP)
that enabled dynamic updates to the data plane and thus allowed the network to
react on changes on the network [17]. These early routing protocols were later
replaced by protocols such as the Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) protocol and
the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). The control plane remained static quite a bit
longer than data plane and dynamic operation was enabled, but rarely utilized [6],
as SNMP was standardized. The dynamic control plane allowed the network to react
to a wider range of changes in the network automatically. It was much later in form
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of the Network Configuration (NETCONF) protocol that this dynamic control plane
was truly enabled. Eight years after SNMP was proposed, a new idea of decoupling
the control plane from NFs altogether was proposed by the GSMP. However, the
idea proposed by GSMP did not become widely used until it was proposed again by
the OpenFlow protocol and the SDN paradigm.
CONTROL PLANE
1970 1990 2000 20101980
Dynamic
Decoupled
Static
OpenFlow
2008
Dynamic
Static
DATA PLANE
Configuration
Files
Command
Line
Interface
Static Routes
NETCONF
2006
SNMP
1988
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1994OSPF
1991RIP
1988
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1981
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Figure 2.5: Evolution of control- and data planes in IP networks.
This section attempts to explain the main principles and features offered by the
SDN paradigm and why they potentially can change how computer networks are per-
ceived. Additionally, the main driver for full-blown SDN deployments, the OpenFlow
protocol, is presented.
2.4.1 Principles and Interfaces
SDN enables new ways to control the network and can solve many use cases that
are hard to solve without it. In order to define SDN more specifically Jarschel et al.
[18] describe in their paper four principles of SDN. These principles are:
Separation of control- and data plane which means the ability for an external
controller to change the forwarding behaviour directly. This allows the control-
and data plane to evolve separately.
Logically centralized control which means that the controller needs to behave
as centralized entity to utilize network wide information to make, for example,
optimized forwarding decisions. This does not mean that the controller would
have to be a single instance but it most likely should be a distributed system
to tackle scalability.
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Open interfaces which means that fundamental interfaces needed to control the
NFs must be and remain open because otherwise there could not exist inter-
operability between implementations. This principle affects also controller to
controller and application to controller APIs in addition to the controller to
NF APIs.
Programmability which means the ability to treat the network as a single pro-
grammable entity. This principle is perhaps best described by the recent at-
tempts to treat network as a network operating system5 in which NFs are
treated similarly like processors are treated in ordinary operating systems.
Here the challenge is to find the right abstraction levels.
These principles must be followed in order to classify a solution as SDN. [18]
SDN defines four interfaces between network devices, namely north-, south-, east-
and westbound APIs. One principle of SDN was the openness of these APIs so that
components using any of them would be easy to replace with another implementa-
tion. The SDN interfaces can be seen in Figure 2.6. The southbound API is needed
for the separation of control and data plane and thus defines the API between
the controller and the NFs. The northbound API is needed to enable applications
running on top of SDN to communicate with the controller. The westbound API
describes controller to controller communication that is needed to multiple SDN
control domains communicate with each other. The eastbound API is required to
communicate with the legacy systems not operating under the SDN paradigm using
protocols such as BGP. [18]
Northbound
Interface
Northbound
Interface
Westbound
Interface
Control Domain 1 Control Domain 2
Eastbound
Interface
Southbound
Interface
Southbound
Interface
Figure 2.6: SDN interfaces.
5Open Network Operating System (ONOS). Available at: http://onosproject.org/.
Accessed 16.03.2016
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2.4.2 Benefits and Challenges
The SDN white paper [16] claims multiple benefits of SDN paradigm. These benefits
can be summarised to the following seven items that potentially offer value when
using SDN:
Vendor independence by using open interfaces the SDN solutions are able to
control NFs from multiple vendors with one management solution.
Improved network utilization by using a centralized controller that has a com-
plete view of the each network paths’ utilization and has the ability to direct
flows to the underutilized paths.
Reduced complexity through automation by using open interfaces to create
tools that reduce operational overhead and reduce network instability.
Higher rate of innovation by allowing the network to be programmed in real-
time to meet business requirements.
Increased network reliability and security by allowing consistent management
and enforcement of configurations and policies from a centralized location.
More granular network control by allowing network operators to apply policies
in different network layers easily.
Better user experience by presenting the network as a whole in a higher abstrac-
tion level to the SDN applications and users.
With these benefits, the SDN paradigm attempts to propose a future of open pro-
grammable networks that allow a rapid pace of innovation as the new norm for the
currently rather static networks. [16]
While SDN offers many benefits, it does not come without problems that need to
be addressed. Sezer et al. [15] identified four yet unsolved challenge areas that are
faced with the rise of the SDN paradigm. Those identified challenge areas were:
Performance becomes challenging to maintain while trying to keep the flexibility
to operate in a generic programmable way.
Scalability becomes a problem in controller design as the controllers need to be
able to scale in all SDN interfaces efficiently without introducing high latencies
to the network.
Security problems arise from the southbound protocols, if not mitigated with se-
cure transport, and controller design that needs to be secured to allow shared
network and infrastructure between various stakeholders.
Interoperability needs to be addressed to accommodate the transition from tradi-
tional networking to SDN since the transformation can not happen in one giant
leap. This requires a way to operate parts of the network in the traditional
way and part of it with SDN solutions.
However, these challenges are being addressed by research community and industry
and it is likely that they will be solved in the coming years. [15]
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2.4.3 OpenFlow
The OpenFlow protocol is a network management protocol designed especially for
SDN. The OpenFlow standard is maintained by Open Networking Foundation (ONF).
There are two important terms to understand in OpenFlow:
Flow is a one-way communication defined by layer 1-4 header information and
metadata. The header information consists of physical layer interfaces, data
link layer addresses, network layer addresses, transport layer ports and other
header information.
Flow Table is a forwarding table used to define the actions to be taken for each
specific flow when encountered.
The OpenFlow protocol allows control and data plane separation by creating mech-
anisms for an external controller to modify NFs’ data plane. The version 1.0 of the
OpenFlow protocol was specified in 2009 and it has been since actively developed
further. [19]
The OpenFlow protocol allows the external controllers to install, modify and re-
move flows from the OpenFlow enabled NFs’ flow tables. In addition, the OpenFlow
protocol specifies mechanisms with which the devices can query the controller for
decision for flows which do not have any rules in the flow table. In Table 2.2 can be
seen a hypotetical example of a NF implementing the OpenFlow protocol with four
installed flow rules in place. [19]
Table 2.2: Example of OpenFlow flow table
Src Dst Src Dst Src Dst
MAC MAC IP IP Port Port ... Action Count
00:... ef:... 192.... 172.... 44677 80 ... → eth0 13
ef:... 00:... 172.... 192.... 80 44677 ... → eth1 755
00:... ef:... 192.... 172.... 44678 443 ... drop 25
00:... ef:... 192.... 192.... * * ... drop 88
* * * * * * * → controller 3
The control offered by OpenFlow’s flow tables is much more detailed than is
possible to achieve with the traditional IP based routing. In IP based routing the
flows between two hosts must use the same path in the network, but with OpenFlow
the flows can each be assigned with unique path depending on the quality of service
requirements of that particular flow. [16]
The OpenFlow protocol offers a low level network configuration solution that can
be used to configure highly detailed forwarding actions on the network. NFs common
to middleboxes that require more complicated logic such as traffic analysis must be
implemented in the controller or in other non-OpenFlow devices since OpenFlow by
design delegates such logic to an external entity. To network monitoring the Open-
Flow protocol offers the controller a detailed view of the network state and statistics
through built-in query mechanism. However, the more complicated monitoring logic
must be implemented in the controller or in other non-OpenFlow devices.
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2.5 Network Function Virtualization (NFV)
NFV proposes an idea to transform NFs into virtual NFs (VNFs) that utilize vir-
tualization technologies to separate software from hardware. Virtualization helps
to decouple NFs from physical location and share infrastructure resources more ef-
ficiently. Decoupling from hardware and moving to use virtualization on generic
hardware enables VNFs to scale better and be more flexible. [20]
Current networks are usually comprised of NFs chained together in a certain
way to achieve the desired network service. The chaining of NFs is usually static.
NFV allows these NF chains to be reordered and moved around dynamically. This
section covers the objectives of NFV and how they can be achieved. In addition,
the requirements and challenges posed by NFV are explored. [20]
2.5.1 Objectives
The main objectives of NFV include cost-effectiveness, reduced power consump-
tion, vendor-independence, flexible networks and rapid innovation. The objectives
of NFV are achieved by virtualization of NFs to commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)
hardware. The cost-effectiveness and reduced power consumption stem from the fact
that this COTS hardware can be shared efficiently between the NFs for example by
using only one server during low peak hours and increasing the amount of active
servers when the high peak hours begin as illustrated in Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8.
Vendor-dependence moves from hardware vendors to virtualization vendors such as
companies developing hypervisors, but this does not the pose same level of depen-
dence since software is usually easier to replace than hardware. Flexible networks
realize when there are mechanism to configure the network dynamically so that NFs
can be dynamically combined, chained and moved around. This is one of the biggest
points of why SDN and NFV support each other rather than being competing tech-
nologies. Rapid innovation is enabled because the VNFs are all software so they can
be more easily be modified and experimented with. [20]
COTS (1) COTS (2) COTS (3)
Figure 2.7: NFV enabled service running in high peak hours.
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COTS (2)
Figure 2.8: NFV enabled service running in low peak hours.
2.5.2 Requirements and Challenges
In recent article [21] Han et al. discuss the challenges and opportunities involved
with NFV. In the article the authors categorise the non-functional requirements of
NFV deployments to four topics.
Performance, which includes ensuring that throughput and latency requirements
are met despite the virtualization.
Manageability, which is required as dynamic nature of NFV further complicates
network management.
Reliability and Stability, where by using COTS hardware traditional SLA re-
quirements can no longer be provided by special hardware but need to be
handled by the NFV deployments to ensure the five-nines or better reliability.
Security, for which NFV brings additional security concerns due resources being
in same hardware and increased system integration complexity, which need to
be handled by the deployments.
Han et al. see the same benefits of NFV as they appear in ETSI White Paper [20],
but they bring up few challenges to be solved before these benefits can fully realised.
First challenge is to solve how network traffic can be dynamically redirected without
service degregation for which SDN could provide solutions. Second challenge raised
by the article is of how to provide the same level of service and performance as today
with less reliable and less stable virtual machines. Third challenge raised is of how
to manage and orchestrate VNFs so that the problems NFV is set to solve will not
reoccur in NFV environments. [21]
3 YANG - DATA MODELLING LANGUAGE
Yet Another Next Generation (YANG) is a data modelling language developed and
standardized by the IETF data modelling language workgroup (NETMOD) in year
2010 [22]. The current version of the language specification is 1.0, but there is an
IETF draft being worked on for the version 1.1. YANG was initially developed for
the needs of the NETCONF protocol to model its configuration and state data,
remote procedure calls (RPCs) and notifications in an attempt to strike balance
between high and low representations of the management data [22].
YANG closely relates to the data modelling language of NETCONF’s predecessor
SNMP, called SMIv2 (Structure of Management Information version 2). SMIv2 is
used to define Management Information Base (MIB) modules which can in fact
be translated to read-only YANG modules automatically, but will without further
modifications miss some of the more advanced features offered by YANG. [22]
YANG is used to model NFs in a standardized way that can easily be converted to
Extensible Markup Language (XML). Hence, YANG models serve as the Application
Programming Interface (API) between the server implementing data access based
on the YANG models and the client accessing this data.
This chapter deals with the concepts and features of YANG. The most common
language constructs are presented and the benefits of the features are explored.
Finally, the existing YANG models are discussed in detail.
3.1 Language Concepts
YANG defines the NF’s configuration and state data in a hierarchical tree structure.
YANG consists of a set of built-in keywords usually referred to as statements and
types, which can be used to construct rich definitions of the data being modelled. In
addition as YANG is a hierarchical language, it offers a similar hierarchical syntax
as JavaScript Object Notation (JSON).
A YANG model contains a module that defines the hierarchical tree structure of
the configuration and state data, the remote procedure calls (RPCs) arguments and
the notification contents. The data described in YANG model can be identified with
unique instance identifiers. In addition, all data that can contain a value is typed
and describes its allowed values. This section aims to describe the basics of these
different kind of concepts that appear in YANG models.
3.1.1 Module
YANG models define modules that have a predefined layout that they should fol-
low. The layout starts with the module header that names the module and defines
its namespace, prefix, dependencies, contact information, description and revisions.
3. YANG - Data Modelling Language 17
After the header follow the type, data, RPC and notification definitions. An illus-
tration of a generic YANG model’s module layout is shown in Figure 3.1.
module example {
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:example";
prefix ex;
/* ... imports, includes ... */
/* ... organization, contact, description ... */
/* ... revisions ... */
/* ... type definitions ... */
/* ... configuration data definitions ... */
/* ... state data definitions ... */
/* ... rpc definitions ... */
/* ... notification definitions ... */
}
Figure 3.1: The YANG model’s module layout.
YANG models are used to define one specific NF in a general way that includes
the essential parts of the NF functionality so that basic deployment scenarios can
work. Additional NF features are either tagged under some specific feature using
if-feature statement that allows conditional data definitions or augmented to the
YANG model from an another YANG model. Basic NF functionality could be
all the MUST features defined in an RFC defining the NF or the smallest common
denominator between multiple NF implementations. YANG models can be imported
by other YANG models allowing reuse of existing data definitions. [22]
Namespaces are used to differentiate modules from each other so that naming
collisions can be avoided even if parties developing different modules have no knowl-
edge of each other. Closely related to namespaces are the prefixes that are used to
simplify modellers’ and reviewers’ burden by shortening the namespace so it can be
quickly and compactly referenced. In published RFCs the namespaces are always
assigned by IANA. [22]
Revision tells the current version of the module so if the module changes for
any reason it can be noticed by implementations using the YANG model and so be
coped by changing the used module revision to a version that both parties support.
Revisions enable backwards compatibility in implementations using YANG models.
[22]
After the module’s header follows the actual data definitions that is the core
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of all YANG models. The common order observable in most standardized YANG
models is to put first the type definitions then the configuration data definitions first,
followed by the state data definitions after which come the RPCs and notifications.
Usually there is only one or two top-level data definition containers per module,
which contain the rest of the data definitions inside of them.
3.1.2 Data Definition
Data definition statements either contain other data definition statements or they
contain at least a type definition statement and can thus hold a data value. Data
definition statements always represent either configuration or state data, in YANG
models the distinction is made with special statement called config within the data
definition statement. Data definition statements can be one of the following:
leaf is a simplest data definition that is at most one instance and has no child data
definition statements. Leaves contains data values.
leaf-list is otherwise the same as leaf, but can contain a list of unique leaves. In
context of leaf-list a key refers to its value.
container is a data definition that is at most one instance and can hold no value,
but can have one or more child data definition statements such as leaves or
containers.
list is otherwise the same as container, but can contain a list of unique containers
identified with one or more key leaves.
choice and cases are data definition statements that do not describe data but
offer a conditional branches in the data structure. A choice is a condition that
ensures that at most only one of choice’s cases can exist at any given time in
the model. One of the most common uses of choice in current models is IPv4
and IPv6 separation.
As noted, these data definition statements can together be used to form complex tree-
like data structures that closely resemble the data required to configure and monitor
NFs. Each YANG model usually defines at least one top-level data definition that
is located at the root of the data structure, however if desired they can define more
of these top-level definitions. An example of leaf and container data definition
statements can be seen in Figure 3.2, describing clock’s state as its standardized in
the YANG data model for system management [25]. [22]
3. YANG - Data Modelling Language 19
container clock {
description
"Monitoring of the system date and time properties.";
leaf current-datetime {
type yang:date-and-time;
description
"The current system date and time.";
}
...
Figure 3.2: Data definition statements for clock state.
Data definition statements can be used in multiple locations in the YANG model
if they are grouped together with a grouping statement. This statement allows
efficient reuse of definitions and thus decreases the modeller’s burden and makes
error more unlikely since a part of a tree used in multiple locations can be changed
at once and the change affects all parts that used the structure. Inside the data
structure a grouping can be referenced using the uses statement. [22]
3.1.3 Instance Identifier
Each data definition in YANG models has a unique instance identifier that can be
used to refer to it. The identifier is constructed by reading the models from top-level
containers towards the definition in question. The identifiers are YANG namespace
aware and thus the namespaces must be included in the identifiers, which is usually
done by using the prefixes to shorten the identifier. The data definitions statements
leaf-list and list must be accessed using their keys or with positional index number
if no keys are specified because otherwise there is no way to make the distinction
between multiple values. [22]
For example Bjo¨rklund [23] has defined a YANG data model for interface man-
agement that defines a three level data structure for basic interface configuration.
In the model the top-level is interfaces container followed by interface list which
contains multiple leaves of which the key is called name and the leaf describing
the interface’s power status is called enabled. An example instance identifier for
interface’s, named eth0, administrative status is shown in Figure 3.3.
/if:interface/if:interface[’eth0’]/if:enabled
Figure 3.3: Instance identifier of an interface’s administrative status.
The instance identifier syntax closely resembles XML Path Language (XPath)
expressions, which is intentional since many advanced features of YANG are enabled
by XPath expressions. In fact instance identifiers are required to be valid XPath
expressions. [22]
3. YANG - Data Modelling Language 20
3.1.4 Type Definition
Each leaf and leaf-list data definition statement holds a mandatory type definition
statement that defines the format that the data must be presented in to be considered
valid. YANG offers some basic built-in types such as string, enumeration and uint64
which can also be found in most generic programming languages. In addition, YANG
also enables modellers to derive their own data types with type definition statements
called typedefs. An example of a type definition statement defined in common YANG
data types by Scho¨nwa¨lder [24] defines system’s date and time as presented in Figure
3.4. The example shows how an existing type definition string can be extended to a
new type that limits its allowed values with the pattern statement to a format such
as ”2016-02-02T10:00:00.12345Z”. [22]
typedef date-and-time {
type string {
pattern ’\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}(\.\d+)?’
+ ’(Z|[\+\-]\d{2}:\d{2})’;
}
...
Figure 3.4: Type definition statement of date and time.
There exists also special types other than those derived from the basic types,
namely leafref and identity. A leafref type indicates that this leaf contains an
instance identifier pointing to some other data node in the data structure. In turn an
identity type defines a globally unique identity in the system that can be referenced
with the identityref statement. These identities can be used to for example separate
protocols such as UDP and TCP from each other. An identity definition can be used
as a base identity for derived identities. Example of a base and a derived identity
shown in Figure 3.5 was defined by Bierman and Bjo¨rklund [25] in a YANG model
for system management. [22]
identity authentication-method {
description
"Base identity for user authentication methods.";
}
identity local-users {
base authentication-method;
description
"Indicates password-based authentication of locally
configured users.";
}
Figure 3.5: Identity statements defining user authentication methods.
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3.1.5 Remote Procedure Call (RPC) and Notification
While most of the YANG specification deals with the data and type definitions,
there are also a way in YANG models to define RPCs and notifications. Both of
these definitions closely relate to data definitions as they define the top-level objects
that are used to contain related data definitions. The RPC definitions contain
definitions for input and output and the notification definitions contain definitions
for information content. [22]
RPC definitions allow the modeller to define procedures with specified input ar-
guments and output results. RPCs defined by YANG models can thus be used to
define a full application programming interface (API) that can be used easily over
the network. In fact, all the operations of the NETCONF protocol are defined as
RPC definitions in YANG models. [22]
Notification definitions can be used to define set of important events that are emit-
ted by the NF. Notifications can be defined to hold even very complex information
contents using the same rules as used with data definitions. Therefore, notifications
can provide a valuable event-based interface to the NF’s state.
3.2 Language Features
YANG offers few special features that distinguish it from a mere JSON document
and enable it to describe efficiently network configurations. These features include
extensive model validation information, standardized way to extend and modify the
models and enforced backwards compatibility between model revisions.
In this section the main features offered by YANG models are presented. The
first and most appealing feature is the possibility of automatic validation of all
the data conforming to a YANG model. Other useful features being explored in
this section include augmentation and deviation of YANG models and backwards
compatibility offered by YANG models defined by following the rules specified in
the YANG specification.
3.2.1 Validation
One of the most important features enabled automatically by YANG models is the
possibility of extensive automatic validation. This is important because validating
data content has proven to be a hard task. This claim is supported by the fact that
data injection, due to insufficient validation, has been listed as the most common
security vulnerability in OWASP’s Top Ten project1 listing web application security
threats for almost a decade. The messages conforming to a specific YANG model
can be validated syntactically and semantically to a great extent assuming these
capabilities are used.
However, automatic validation offered by YANG is no silver bullet to all validation
problems as it provides the essential validations from the NF’s point of view but
leaves the implementation specific restrictions open. For example if there is a string
value for some NF attribute and no further restrictions required by the NF, there
1OWASP Top Ten Cheat Sheet. Available at: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_
Top_Ten_Cheat_Sheet. Accessed 13.02.2016
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might be an implementation need to restrict that value further. This need might
arise if the API to the NF is implemented using mechanisms that forbid some special
characters appearing in the data thus requiring the characters to be escaped or
removed from the data. In addition, there might be some operating system limits to
some values like username length and other variables that are not NF’s restrictions
but are implementation’s restrictions.
There are two types of validation offered by YANG models: syntax and seman-
tic validation. Syntax validation is the monotonous part which ensures that only
allowed byte sequences are found in the data, which is usually the action that is
associated with the word validation. YANG models contain inherited syntax vali-
dation capabilities since all the nodes on the models are typed and structured. The
structure and types allow for creation of validation code or schemas that can be used
to automatically validate the messages conforming to YANG models. Semantic val-
idation is a more complex validation type that can be used to describe dependencies
between data definitions. YANG models can be added with statements when and
must that can be used to describe conditional expressions that need to be evaluated
to determine the semantic validity of the data. For example the when statement
could be used to allow transport layer port definition to show only on protocols
that support ports, such as TCP or UDP. The must statement could be used ensure
that at least two interfaces exist when creating a router instance. An example of
the use of semantic validation in YANG models can be seen in Figure 3.6 presented
as an example by Bjo¨rklund [23] in the RFC defining a YANG model for interface
management.
One of the most widespread types of XML document validation is the use of
XML Schema Definitions (XSD) that can be used by XML libraries to automatically
validate data contents [26]. The other more advanced XML based approach is the
use of Document Schema Definition Languages (DSDL) that includes standardized
mechanisms for syntax and semantic validation [26]. However, YANG models are
not constrained to just XML based validation and can be automatically converted
to other schemas or to generic code that do the validation.
3.2.2 Augmentation
Standard YANG models should cover only the very basic NF capabilities, with some
advanced features included with the if-feature statement. Augmentation is a YANG
feature that can be used to extend existing YANG models with new data definitions.
There are few reasons why augmentation might be used such as building another
standard YANG model on top of an existing standard YANG model, adding optional
and experimental NF functionalities or adding implementation and vendor specific
functionalities not found in NF specification. [22]
Augmenting YANG models works by including the standard YANG model being
augmented to a new YANG model that then uses the augment statement to add
new data definitions to the standard YANG model. An example augmentation
of the YANG model for interface management defined by Bjo¨rklund [23] can be
seen in Figure 3.6. The new YANG model formed this way can offer advanced
functionalities if the configuring party knows how to make use of them, but in the
same time can remain backwards compatible with the default model. Augmentation
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has some limitations that require the YANG models to be augmented in a way that
does not break the general YANG modelling rules. In addition, no mandatory data
definitions can be augmented to existing data defintions, which also ensures the
backwards compatibility. [22]
...
augment "/if:interfaces/if:interface" {
when "if:type = ’ianaift:l2vlan’";
leaf base-interface {
type if:interface-ref;
must "/if:interfaces/if:interface[if:name = current()]"
+ "/vlan:vlan-tagging = ’true’" {
description
"The base interface must have VLAN tagging enabled.";
}
}
leaf vlan-id {
type uint16 {
range "1..4094";
}
must "../base-interface" {
description
"If a vlan-id is defined, a base-interface must
be specified.";
}
}
}
...
Figure 3.6: Augmenting VLAN model on top of interface model.
3.2.3 Deviation
While default YANG models strive for the very basic protocol functionalities, some-
times there might be NF implementations that do not implement even all of these.
And sometimes there might have been some lapse in the review of the model and
some special optional functionalities have slipped into the model. In these cases
existing models can be deviated from the published standard by, for example, for-
bidding some of the fields in the existing model.
Deviations are mostly used to document that this particular implementation
misses some vital piece of protocol specification and thus functions only partially.
However, deviations are strongly discouraged and should be used only as the last
resort. Deviation statement can be one of not-supported, add, replace or delete.
The not-supported statement just indicates that the given node that the deviation
targets can not be configured on this NF. On the other hand, the add statement
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adds new substatements as shown in Figure 3.7, replace statement modifies existing
substatements and delete statement removes existing substatements. [22]
...
deviation /if:interfaces/if:interface {
deviate add {
max-elements 32;
}
}
...
Figure 3.7: Deviating interface model by limiting list’s length.
Despite that deviations are discouraged, they are the preferable way to commu-
nicate limitations to client implementations. In addition, if there is an operating
system that would limit the available interface count up to 32, then the deviation
shown in Figure 3.7 would be the best way to deal with the situation.
3.2.4 Backwards Compatibility
With revision numbers implementations interpreting YANG modelled messages can
distinguish the supported revisions and adapt to the situation when they are not.
YANG specification also describes update rules that must not be broken in order to
ensure that the model remains backwards compatible with the old revisions. The
rules defined by YANG specification dictate that any changes to published module
should create new revision of the module, the module’s name and namespace must
not be changed, obsolete data definitions must not be removed and all the changes
to the definitions must be backwards compatible. [22]
The backwards compatible changes to definitions include, but are not limited to:
• statements limiting the value space can be expanded but not reduced.
• must and mandatory statements can be removed.
• default statements can be added.
• new type definitions, RPCs and notifications can be added.
• new data definitions can be added as long as they do not add mandatory
statements to existing data definitions unless they are made conditional with
the if-feature statement.
With these rules it is ensured that YANG models can evolve over time without
breaking existing applications. Naturally, there could be changes that can not follow
these rules but those would require completely new YANG model and thus are not
recommended. [22]
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3.3 Existing Models
Currently there are only a few standardized YANG models. The standardized YANG
models define the very basic system NF functionality, mentioned earlier as the func-
tionalities that are taken for granted in any NF, and some of them define the NET-
CONF protocol. However, more YANG models are under development, some even
in the late draft stages and should become standards during 2016.
The system functionality is not by itself enough to define any meaningful NF.
Thus, the full potential of YANG as modelling language will not be realized until
most of the common NFs currently found on the networks are standardized. Full
potential can not be reached because different implementations do not yet share a
common API for NF functionality and thus the workload to support different vendors
remains high. Yet, even providing a formal API specification with YANG is a step
forward compared to the proprietary single purpose APIs, since the implementations
would at least get to utilize the common features offered by YANG.
In this section a small survey is made to the existing YANG models both standard-
ized and ones in different draft stages. Since the standardized models are already
complete they are first discussed with more detail, followed by a glimpse to the draft
models.
3.3.1 Standard Models
The first standard YANG model was made to describe the common YANG data
types in 2010 right after YANG specification [22] was standardized. That first
YANG model was shortly followed by standardized YANG models for the NET-
CONF protocol. The first YANG model to describe actual NF functionality was not
standardized until 2014 when the YANG model for interface management by Bjo¨rk-
lund [23] was standardized. Thereafter YANG models describing NF functionality
have been standardized in a rather slow pace amounting to only four models.
Currently standardized YANG models describing NF functionality include:
A YANG Data Model for Interface Management which defines configuration
definitions that can be used to modify interfaces and state definitions that can
be used to access interfaces’ status and statistics such as packet counts. [23]
A YANG Data Model for IP Management which defines configuration defi-
nitions that can be used modify interfaces’ IPv4 and IPv6 parameters such as
addresses and state definitions can be used to access interfaces’ operational IP
status. [27]
A YANG Data Model for System Management which defines configuration
definitions for system information and users, NTP, DNS and Radius and state
definitions for retrieving system information and time. In addition, this YANG
model is the first YANG model not specific to the NETCONF protocol to
include RPC definitions. [25]
A YANG Data Model for SNMP Configuration which defines extensive con-
figuration definitions to configure SNMP parameters, but does not define any
state definitions since those are expected to be converted from MIB modules.
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In addition, this YANG model is the first YANG model to extensively utilize
the YANG submodules that can be used to split a YANG module into multiple
smaller modules. [28]
With these YANG models it is already possible to perform basic system config-
uration that could be used to configure systems with simple network configuration
such as desktop computers. The standardized models still lack much of the models
needed for middleboxes and routers that might contain tens or even hundreds of
NFs.
3.3.2 Draft Models
The YANG models need to go through a review process that can take a long while
before they become published standards. These YANG models that are being re-
viewed are called drafts and they can and do change based on the input of the YANG
model reviewers. There exists three draft models that are very near of becoming
standards:
A YANG Data Model for Network Access Control List (ACL) which will
standardize the way how packet filters are configured. [29]
A YANG Data Model for Routing Management which will form a base con-
figuration for routing. This base YANG model describes only static routing,
but is expected to be extended by various routing protocols such as OSPF and
BGP. [30]
A YANG Data Model for Syslog which will standardize the way how logging
is configured. [31]
Other interesting YANG model drafts still in earlier stages of development include
definitions for following network protocols: OSPF, BGP, IS-IS, IPsec, BFD, VRRP,
DHCP, VLAN, IGMP and PIM. The mentioned YANG model drafts are modelled
outside of the NETMOD workgroup in their own protocols’ IETF workgroups. Cur-
rently there is no standardized YANG models made by the other IETF workgroups
so it remains unclear how long it takes for a draft to reach standard status in those,
but it could be predicted that at least some of the drafts will get standardized in
2017.
4 NETCONF - NETWORK CONFIGURATION
PROTOCOL
The NETCONF protocol allows the NF to implement a formal API using YANG
models that can be used to manage the NF’s configuration data and to monitor NF’s
operational state. The NETCONF protocol uses a remote procedure call (RPC)
paradigm built on top of an XML encoded message stream. The NETCONF proto-
col can be used to enable dynamic management of the network and it plays along
with the new rising network paradigms such as SDN and NFV. Since the NETCONF
protocol is XML based it can also be used to implement complex controller oper-
ations with relative ease by using XML transformation techniques like EXtensible
Stylesheet Language Transformations (XSLT). [32]
NETCONF is often described as the successor of SNMP. This is because both
protocols describe a holistic view of network management, where one can define stan-
dardized interfaces to configure and monitor network devices using a single protocol.
Figure 4.1 shows a side-by-side comparison of SNMP and NETCONF in different
levels. As definition language SNMP uses MIB which at high level is very similar
to YANG used in NETCONF, both can be used to model data and its restrictions
in detail. Both protocols also communicate with custom NF instrumentation that
does the integration with the NF APIs and the actual NF implementations. For
communicating with the NF instrumentation SNMP uses ASN.1 encoded values op-
posite to the UTF-8 encoded values used by NETCONF. Another difference is that
NETCONF separates operations from messages whereas SNMP messages contain
the requests as a value in the message header. NETCONF approach allows arbi-
trary operations defined by the definition language. Another difference in message
level is that in SNMP requests and responses are unidirectional since SNMP usu-
ally utilizes the UDP transport protocol whereas NETCONF is connection oriented
protocol allowing RPCs and their replies to function in bidirectional channel. As
message encoding SNMP uses binary format and NETCONF uses XML. Monitoring
events are semantically almost the same in SNMP Informs and NETCONF notifi-
cations. SNMP is usually configured to use UDP as transport mechanism but it can
be configured to use TCP also. In addition, SNMP can have optional security added
at the message layer using methods specified in the SNMPv3 standard. Whereas
NETCONF can use SSH or TLS on top of a TCP connection to offer the transport
layer protection. [32][10]
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Figure 4.1: Comparison of NETCONF and SNMP layers.
This chapter goes briefly through the main concepts and features offered by the
NETCONF protocol and then explains how the protocol can be used to configure
and monitor NFs. In addition, the security aspects, transport and access control of
the protocol are discussed in detail. Finally, a quick look is taken on the existing
protocol implementations, which include both client and server implementations.
4.1 Protocol Concepts
The NETCONF protocol defines a network management protocol between a client,
which in this case is the network management system or administrator of the system,
and a device containing one or more NFs. These client and server start the protocol
session by exchanging capabilities, which define what operations are available for
use, in a HELLO message. The HELLO is the first NETCONF specific message
sent after the secure transport layer is established. [32]
The NETCONF protocol defines RPCs, sent after the initial capability exchange,
as operations. Almost all of the predefined operations target some datastore, which
is a storage where NFs’ configurations are stored, but developers can implement new
operations that might not have anything to do with datastores. [32]
This section explains the main concepts related to the NETCONF protocol, start-
ing from the NETCONF capabilities and protocol sessions. Another important
concept discussed is the datastore, which is the backend where NETCONF servers
store all the configuration data. In addition, the implications of the operations and
notifications in NETCONF are explored.
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4.1.1 Capabilities
The NETCONF protocol is designed to be highly extensible and to this end it
supports in the initial exchange of HELLO messages the capabilities offered by both
communicating parties. This exchange of capabilities permits the client to adjust
its behaviour based on the supported functionality on the server. A capability in
NETCONF is a threefold concept:
Capabilities are special namespaces assigned by IANA to indicate capabilities that
can not be fully described using YANG alone. Usually there is no need to add
new capabilities to NETCONF.
Models supported by an NF are also exchanged in the capability exchange so that
client can learn the YANG models and their reversions implemented on the
server.
Features supported by an NF are exchanged as parameters inside the supported
models. [32]
The actual capabilities use their assigned namespace but supported modules and
features use a special parameter syntax to encode the capability information. In
Figure 4.2 can be seen a simple NETCONF HELLO message, which indicates sup-
port for protocol version 1.1, candidate capability and ietf-system module at revision
2014-08-06 with authentication, local-user and ntp features enabled.
<hello xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<capabilities>
<capability>
urn:ietf:params:netconf:base:1.1
</capability>
<capability>
urn:ietf:params:netconf:capability:candidate:1.0
</capability>
<capability>
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-system?
module=ietf-system&
revision=2014-08-06&
features=authentication,local-users,ntp
</capability>
</capabilities>
<session-id>2</session-id>
</hello>
Figure 4.2: Example of a HELLO message describing NFs’ capabilities.
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4.1.2 Sessions
The NETCONF protocol is session-oriented and uses client-server architecture in
which the server waits listening on an assigned port for clients to connect to it.
When a client connects to the server, the server authenticates the client and the client
authenticates the server thus creating a scheme called mutual authentication. Once
the authentications are done a NETCONF session is started with the exchange of
HELLO messages, the session receives its own unique session identification assigned
by the server. The same client can connect to one server with multiple connections
simultaneously and other clients can also connect to the server while there are active
sessions already going on. [32]
The NETCONF specification is not bound to any specific transport protocol and
can be used with multiple existing transport protocols [32]. The specification man-
dates that all NETCONF implementations must at least support the SSH protocol
[33] as the transport protocol [32]. The NETCONF protocol utilizes the underlying
transport protocol to a great extent and does not try to reinvent the wheel on that
regard. In Figure 4.3 a typical message exchange leading to an established NET-
CONF session layered on top of SSH transport protocol is shown. As it can be seen
from the figure the almost all of the messages are SSH messages in the protocol’s
different phases [33] (key exchange, service request, user authentication and channel
creation) leaving the NETCONF protocol session creation to only a really simple
XML encoded HELLO exchange.
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Figure 4.3: Sequence diagram of SSH/NETCONF session initiation.
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Since there can be multiple open sessions to a server, but there is only one active
configuration on the server at any given time, the sessions changing the configuration
need to lock and unlock it in a way that the sessions’ changes do not clash with each
other. Sometimes it is also necessary to kill misbehaving sessions for which the
NETCONF protocol offers a mechanism. If a session dies or is closed during a
configuration operation the specification mandates that the changes are reverted so
that the server is not left in unspecified state. [32]
4.1.3 Datastores
The NETCONF standard specifies datastore as a conceptual place that can be used
to store and access the configuration and state data. The way how datastores are
implemented is up to the implementation but they could for example be imple-
mented using simple files or complex distributed databases. There are three types
of datastores defined by the NETCONF protocol specification: startup, running and
candidate, of which only running is mandatory to implement. The startup datastore
is used to persistently store NFs’ configuration data and it is copied as running data-
store at startup. The running datastore reflects the configuration data currently in
use. And the candidate datastore can be used as staging area for changes to be later
pushed into the running datastore. [32]
The datastores hold the configuration data defined by YANG models, which serve
as the specification of what kind of configuration is allowed to be stored in the datas-
tores [32]. By supporting only the running datastore the NETCONF implementation
will lack some of the more advanced features such as validate and confirmed-commit
operations. Hence, the more advanced NETCONF implementations usually imple-
ment also the startup and candidate datastores.
The state data is held only in the running datastore since operational state in-
dicates only the present and thus can not be stored the same way as configuration
can. For that same reason, the state data can not be modified either. A hypothetical
NETCONF implementation only having a running datastore with only state data
accessible would be very close to the functionality SNMP is used for currently.
4.1.4 Operations
Operations in the NETCONF protocol are all defined as RPCs in the relevant YANG
models. The YANG models also define the input arguments and output contents
for each operation. All operations are XML encoded within rpc messages which are
in fact the only messages allowed to be sent by clients in NETCONF sessions after
the initial HELLO exchange. Since operations are RPCs they also have a result
that the applications calling the RPC expect to receive. This result is sent back for
each rpc message in a rpc-reply message usually containing an ok tag if everything
went well or an error tag detailing the reason for the error if something went wrong.
Figure 4.4 shows the basic message flow in NETCONF sessions, which is simply just
sending RPCs and receiving replies to them. [34]
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Figure 4.4: Sequence diagram of typical client server interaction.
By default the NETCONF protocol defines nine different operations, but few
more are supported in implementations that implement some of the more advanced
capabilities. The basic operations are:
get-config operation is used to query configuration data from NETCONF server.
The query results can be filtered to include only essential parts of the config-
uration.
edit-config operation is used to create, update and delete NETCONF server’s con-
figuration data. The operation works with running and candidate datastores.
copy-config operation is used to copy configuration data from a datastore to an-
other. The most common use case for this operation is to store running data-
store to startup datastore.
delete-config operation is used to completely remove all configuration from a data-
store. The operation works with running and candidate datastores.
lock operation is used to protect a datastore from other sessions’ changes and allow
contention free modifications to the configuration data.
unlock operation used to remove the acquired lock from a datastore.
get operation is used to query configuration and state data from NETCONF server.
However, state data can be queried from running datastore.
close-session operation is used to end the current NETCONF session. This oper-
ation can be sent either by the NETCONF client or the NETCONF server.
kill-session operation is used to terminate targeted active NETCONF session. This
can be used as administrative operation to clean idle sessions or to remove
misbehaving sessions.
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By supporting more advanced capabilities (candidate, confirmed-commit and vali-
date) implementations can also support following operations:
commit operation is used to atomically commit candidate datastore’s contents to
running datastore making the candidate configuration active.
cancel-commit operation is used to revert pending confirmed-commit operation,
which allows network wide commits to rollback if any errors occur on any of
the NFs being configured.
validate operation is used to check configuration’s validity without actually apply-
ing the configuration as the new operational configuration.
As noted, the YANG models, used to define NF functionalities, can also include
RPC definitions that enable new operations on the NF. A NETCONF client can
call these new operations just as it can call the default operations and expect the
results in form specified by the YANG model. Examples of custom operations can
be found in the YANG data model for system management [25], which defines three
such operations called: set-current-datetime, system-restart and system-shutdown.
4.1.5 Notifications
Whilst the NETCONF protocol is mainly designed for configuration management,
there is a powerful monitoring capability specified in the specification. This capa-
bility is called notifications which like operations are defined by the YANG models.
Notifications allow NETCONF clients to subscribe to specified notifications and re-
ceive them when such event is generated. Using notifications allows a lightweight
way to monitor changes on the NFs’ state. An example of typical notification inter-
action between NETCONF client and server can be seen in Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5: Sequence diagram of typical notification interaction.
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Notifications can be received, depending on the server’s and client’s capabilities,
interleaved with the other protocol operations or they need a dedicated session. A
good analogy to NETCONF notifications is SNMP traps with the exception that a
client does not receive all the notifications, but only those it subscribed for and is
allowed (by the access control rules) to receive.
4.2 Network Management Features
The NETCONF operations and notifications are powerful tools for network config-
uration and monitoring. The operations open the NFs’ active and pending config-
urations and operational state to be accessible through network on demand. The
notifications enable a reactive management solutions that can react as NFs’ oper-
ational state changes. Furthermore all this management information accessible as
XML encoded content, thus allowing integration to a wide array of existing XML
tools.
In this section a quick look is taken on how NETCONF can be used to manage
NF configuration and how it can be used to monitor the NF state. When examining
these features a comparison to the existing solutions is made to provide some insight
why NETCONF was created.
4.2.1 Configuration Management
As the protocol’s name indicates NETCONF was mainly designed for network con-
figuration in mind. The protocol offers transactional way of handling changes in
the network, for example administrator could configure ten NFs simultaneously and
perform a delayed commit so that if even one of the commits fails or NF being con-
figured loses the channel to controller administrator can rollback all the devices to
the last working configuration. This allows so called atomic commits to the network.
Different ways to manage the NF’s configuration are shown in Table 4.1. The
simplest way is to use the writable-running capability which allows direct, instanta-
neous, editing of NF configuration much like is done usually when configuring NFs
with CLI. Another option is to use the candidate capability which allows for changes
to be made in a placeholder datastore called candidate and once all the changes are
made, these changes can be committed to the running datastore much like is done
when configuring NFs with configuration files. These two approaches are very much
alike in achieved functionality and already with these capabilities NETCONF tells
if the changes were applied successfully or offers a detailed error information if they
were not. However, with confirmed-commit capability NETCONF offers a method to
perform network wide transactions by conditionally committing changes to multiple
NFs and only if all went through successfully acknowledging the commit and thus
making the changes permanent, if a failure occurs, all the commits can be reverted
and the network is left unchanged. The confirmed-commit capability also prevents
sessions from locking themselves out due to a configuration error as the commit will
not be acknowledged if the session can not connect to the NF, thus providing timed
rollback on such occasions. [32]
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Table 4.1: Configuration Styles
Capability Operation Affected Datastores
writable-running lock running
edit-config running
unlock running
(distinct-startup) copy-config running → startup
candidate lock candidate
edit-config candidate
(validate) validate candidate
commit candidate → running
unlock candidate
(distinct-startup) copy-config running → startup
confirmed-commit lock candidate
edit-config candidate
(validate) validate candidate
(confirmed-)commit candidate → running
commit candidate
unlock candidate
(distinct-startup) copy-config running → startup
Another feature of NETCONF found on almost all network management imple-
mentations is the ability to save the running configuration to remain across NF
restarts. This ability is shown in Table 4.1 as the distinct-startup capability.
The NETCONF protocol differentiates configuration from state by design and
this differentiation is modelled into the YANG models that form the NF’s NET-
CONF API. The NETCONF server can be asked to hand in only configuration
information with the get-config operation that returns only config nodes. And if
both configuration and state is requested, the get operation can be used.
Although differentiating configuration and state allows already some reduction of
the received data per request, the protocol also offers an extensive filtering mech-
anisms that can be used to further limit the received data per query. The two
mechanisms are subtree and xpath filtering, although xpath filtering is enabled only
if NF’s NETCONF implementation supports the xpath capability. With these fil-
tering mechanisms it is possible to limit the query results to only a subtrees that
match the filter thus reducing the amount of transmitted data drastically.
4.2.2 State Monitoring
NETCONF can also be used to monitor the devices. This can be accomplished
by polling the device state periodically or by subscribing to different notifications
coming from the device. The polling of the device state with NETCONF is very
much similar to SNMP queries. Consequently subscribing to notifications is very
much similar to SNMP traps or IPFIX.
The polling of device state is done in NETCONF with the get operation that
can be limited to specific data with the subtree or xpath filtering in the same way
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as configuration can be filtered. Many YANG models describe data definition that
contains the identifiers for NF’s state data. An example of standardized state data
can be found in a YANG data model for interface management [23] that defines
interface’s packet statistics that contain count for inbound and outbound octets,
inbound and outbound unicast packets and so forth. [32]
The other method used to monitor NFs with NETCONF are notifications, which
as said earlier resembles SNMP traps and IPFIX. Currently there are not many
notification types defined, but like RPCs and data definitions, notifications can be
added by any YANG model. Notifications are subject to the same access control
rules as other NETCONF objects and they also contain a mechanism to filter the
unwanted notifications and a mechanism to replay past notifications if the moni-
toring application was not connected when the notifications occurred. Notifications
are considered much more resource efficient way of monitoring and polling the state
using the get operation should be reserved for special cases if possible.
4.3 Security Measures
NF configuration usually holds information about sensitive things such as network
topology and passwords. Since configuration information is very sensitive, it should
be kept secure when transmitting it to the NFs. Hence, the NETCONF protocol’s
specification has large portions focusing on the security of the protocol and there
are multiple RFCs discussing different security related aspects of the protocol. [32]
The YANG data model for system management [25] defined a standard way
to handle users in NETCONF servers. With the module it is possible to modify
NETCONF users and associate SSH keys and passwords with them. This is currently
the most essential YANG model to implement in order to create interoperable and
secure NETCONF servers.
In this section two security measures that are used to enhance the NETCONF
protocol’s security are presented. The first one is secure transport protocol which is
mandatory in all NETCONF implementations. The second one is the NETCONF
Access Control Model (NACM) that can be used to limit users’ ability to read and
modify the NF’s configuration and state data.
4.3.1 Secure Transport
The NETCONF standard specifies a mandatory use of secure transportation mecha-
nism that provides authentication, data integrity, confidentiality, and replay protec-
tion. There are currently two transport protocols with an active specification that
can be used in NETCONF: SSH and TLS. Specifications for those protocols define
that mutual authentication between the client and the server must be performed,
which should thwart Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks against the NETCONF ses-
sions. [32]
The specification for SSH transport in NETCONF has an IANA assigned port
830 for the server to listen on for incoming connections. The incoming connections
are processed as follows:
1. The client connects, using TCP, to the server’s port 830.
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2. The client invokes the SSH transport protocol to exchange the integrity and
encryption keys for the connection.
3. The client invokes the SSH authentication protocol to authenticate the user.
4. The client invokes the SSH connection protocol to open an SSH session
5. The client starts the NETCONF subsystem.
6. The client and the server send the NETCONF HELLO messages.
An example of this connection sequence can be seen in Figure 4.3. In addition, it
is also mandated that the client must verify the server’s identity and vice-versa the
server must verify the client’s identity. [35]
The specification for TLS transport in NETCONF has an IANA assigned port
6513 for the server to listen on for incoming connections. The incoming connections
are processed as follows:
1. The client connects, using TCP, to the server’s port 6513.
2. The client initiates the TLS handshake protocol to exchange the integrity and
encryption keys for the connection.
3. The client and the server authenticate each other’s certificates and finish the
TLS handshake protocol.
4. The client and the server send the NETCONF HELLO messages.
In addition, the NETCONF’s TLS specification contains predefined rules that are
used to derive the client’s username from the certificate contents since the TLS
protocol itself does not specify username concept. [36]
4.3.2 NETCONF Access Control Model (NACM)
In 2012 the NETCONF protocol gained an RFC describing a way for administrators
to limit the data access on NFs, called NETCONF Access Control Model (NACM).
The standard included guidelines for YANG model developers on how to embed the
NACM controls into YANG models, description of the NACM functionality and a
new YANG model describing how to modify the NACM access lists. NACM also
specifies concept of groups to NETCONF user management, where user can belong
to zero or more groups and these groups can be given access to different NETCONF
resources. [34]
NACM can be used to limit access to NETCONF operations, datastores and noti-
fications. The NACM limits NETCONF users’ access using permissions. The limits
on operations are enforced with the execute permission, the limits on datastores
are enforced with the create, read, update and delete (CRUD) permissions and the
limits on notifications are enforced with the read permission. NACM offers possibil-
ities that are not available in any other network management protocol currently as
there is no truly well defined way to limit authenticated users’ rights in SNMP nor
OpenFlow. [34]
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As NACM’s name indicates it operates on access lists by going through the lists
from top to bottom trying to find matching rule that permits or denies the action
being checked. In Figure 4.6 is shown a snippet of a possible access list that allows
a user belonging to observer group to only retrieve interfaces’ state information but
deny all other access to the system.
<rule-list>
<name>observer-acl</name>
<group>observer</group>
<rule>
<name>permit-read-interface</name>
<rule-type>data-node</rule-type>
<module-name>ietf-interfaces</module-name>
<path xmlns:if="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-interfaces">
/if:interfaces-state/if:interface
</path>
<access-operations>read</access-operations>
<action>permit</action>
<comment>
Allow read access to the interfaces’ state.
</comment>
</rule>
<rule>
<name>permit-exec-get</name>
<rule-type>protocol-operation</rule-type>
<module-name>ietf-netconf</module-name>
<rpc-name>get</rpc-name>
<access-operations>exec</access-operations>
<action>permit</action>
<comment>
Allow the statistics group to execute ’get’ operation.
</comment>
</rule>
<rule>
<name>deny-all</name>
<module-name>*</module-name>
<access-operations>*</access-operations>
<action>deny</action>
<comment>
Deny all other access.
</comment>
</rule>
</rule-list>
Figure 4.6: Example of NACM rules defining statistics observer.
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4.4 Existing Implementations
Since the NETCONF protocol was first standardized in 2006 it is not surprising
that there are already many implementations of the protocol. Since NETCONF is a
client-server architecture protocol there are both client and server implementations.
In this section the existing client and server implementations are explored and
some of their internal details explained. The popularity and maturity of existing
implementations usually tells a tale of the acceptance a given protocol has received,
for example if there was a great protocol with zero implementations then it probably
is not very widely accepted and used protocol.
4.4.1 Client Implementations
NETCONF client implementations are required to handle the integration with the
underlying transport protocol and provide a mechanism for the user of the imple-
mentation to input data to the implementation that is then packed into NETCONF
rpc messages and to receive the result from the NETCONF rpc-reply messages as
output. Use cases where NETCONF client implementation is needed are network
management systems and testing applications.
There are various NETCONF client implementations varying from simple wrap-
pers to a more complex validating implementations. Most notable standalone open
source implementations are ncclient1, libnetconf 2 and JNC 3. These three implemen-
tations are examples of library implementations that provide an API for a network
management system to use NETCONF, but do not do any content generation them-
selves. However, there exists also implementations inside SDN controllers that pro-
vide a southbound API implementation of NETCONF. The most prominent SDN
controller implementations are OpenDaylight4 and ONOS 5. These two implementa-
tions are capable of, to some extent, automatically generating configuration based
on the YANG models whilst the other implementations leave it up to the application
developer to generate the contents of the NETCONF messages.
4.4.2 Server Implementations
NETCONF server implementations are required to listen on incoming connections,
transform the received operations into actions against the internal datastores whilst
validating and authorizing them and provide a way for the NF instrumentation to
perform actions based on the received operations. Since NETCONF servers have to
perform a lot more functionality than NETCONF clients, they tend to involve a lot
more NETCONF specific code and are thus harder to implement.
From the currently available and active NETCONF server implementations a few
are commercial and one is open source. All of the active implementations support all
1Python library for NETCONF clients. Available at: http://ncclient.org/. Accessed
16.03.2016
2C library for NETCONF. Available at: https://github.com/CESNET/libnetconf. Accessed
16.03.2016
3Java NETCONF Client. Available at: https://github.com/tail-f-systems/JNC. Accessed
16.03.2016
4SDN Platform. Available at: https://www.opendaylight.org/. Accessed 16.03.2016
5Network Operating System. Available at: http://onosproject.org/. Accessed 16.03.2016
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the NETCONF operations defined in the protocol’s RFC [32], but implement varying
combinations of the extension RFCs defined for NETCONF. However, none of the
servers come with large scale instrumentation for any existing operating systems,
most likely due to the fact that current users of the NETCONF protocol do not lie
in open source community, but rather in the operator and telecommunications sector.
The most prominent of the commercial implementations are confd6 and netconfd-
pro7. In addition, the one active open source implementation is netopeer 8. The
integration with the NF instrumentation in netconfd-pro and netopeer relies on the
generation of code stubs that the developer needs to fill in order to embedded his own
logic into the server process. The integration in confd on the other hand provides
a precompiled master agent to which application developers bind with custom TCP
based protocol and subscribe to different events from the master agent. All of the
servers are implemented using the C programming language.
6Management Agent for Networking Devices. Available at: https://developer.cisco.com/
site/confD/. Accessed 16.03.2016
7Network Management Server Toolkit. Available at: http://www.yumaworks.com/. Accessed
16.03.2016
8NETCONF toolset. Available at: https://github.com/cesnet/netopeer. Accessed
16.03.2016
5 YANG MODEL DEVELOPMENT
YANG model development is a process that involves several different developer roles
ranging from the people who create NF standards, through the people who utilize
the standards to the people who create the NF instrumentation and implement the
NF standards. These roles are namely modellers, reviewers, device developers and
application developers [37].
Modellers are ideally the sort of people that understand the very internals of given
NF such as protocol or service. Usually the same people who standardize pro-
tocols are in excellent position to define the YANG models when the stan-
dardization is complete as they possess in depth knowledge of the protocol
and are not too focused on any specific implementation of that given protocol.
Modeller should also take into account model extensibility and ensure that it
can be adapted to possible future changes. [37]
Reviewers should also possess in-depth knowledge of the NF being modelled but do
not require so much knowledge of YANG modelling itself, but rather evaluate
the substance in the model and how well it fits its intended use case. Reviewers
also assess the understandability of the model and thus ensure higher quality
models. [37]
Device developers are the people who interpret the YANG models and implement
the functionality described there into NF instrumentation. In other words, it is
device developers’ job to transform the YANG models into format understood
by the NF implementations. [37]
Application developers are the people who gather information of existing YANG
models in the network and build management applications utilizing these mod-
els to build business logic. A typical example of application developer could
be a network management system developer that is implementing service pro-
visioning and monitoring. [37]
In this chapter the focus is mainly on the modellers and the device developers. At
first the concept of NF instrumentation is explained and the achievable integration
levels with current NF implementations is explored. Then it is explored how a
modeller’s work flow goes and how that affects the device developers. And finally,
a prototype YANG model for IPsec and IKEv2 configuration implemented for the
purposes of this thesis is presented.
5.1 Network Function Instrumentation
New YANG models are defined and new NFs are implemented continuously. This
leads to network devices that contain complex collections of NFs which might differ
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from each other greatly. These YANG models and NF implementations need to be
bound together by using something called instrumentation. [38]
In this section the concept of management daemon, that can be used to implement
NF instrumentation, is explained. In addition, the levels that these management
daemons can integrate the YANG models with the NF implementations are explored.
5.1.1 Management Daemon
A daemon is a system process that is started as background process to handle events
occurring within the operating system. There are usually many daemons running
simultaneously performing system tasks such as receiving and storing system logs
and keeping system’s time up to date. The origins of the word can be traced back
to 1960 and the origin is explained by the following quote:
Our use of the word daemon was inspired by the Maxwell’s daemon of
physics and thermodynamics. (My background is Physics.) Maxwell’s
daemon was an imaginary agent which helped sort molecules of different
speeds and worked tirelessly in the background. We fancifully began to use
the word daemon to describe background processes which worked tirelessly
to perform system chores.1
- Fernando J. Corbato
Therefore, in this thesis we fancifully use the term management daemon to de-
scribe a background process in the system that controls an NF and listens to con-
figuration events from the management protocol implementation and converts those
requests into actions targeting the running system. These configuration events could
be requests to read the running system’s state or requests to modify the configu-
ration. In addition, management daemon can observe the NF that it controls for
events that it can then notify to the management protocol implementation.
5.1.2 Levels of Integration
There are different ways for two programs to integrate together, be it through oper-
ating system signals and configuration files defined in some domain specific language
(DSL) or some sort of an API. During the prototyping phase of this thesis it became
apparent that there are at least three different levels of integration with configured
programs that can be achieved with NETCONF and YANG based solution. These
levels, ordered by efficiency from lowest to highest, are:
YANG-to-DSL in which the configuration data presented in YANG specified for-
mat is simply converted to the NF implementation’s DSL by the management
daemon reading the NETCONF datastore and then the NF implementation
process is signaled to reread its configuration files.
YANG-to-API in which the management daemon reading the NETCONF trans-
forms the YANG configuration data to dynamic API calls that provide an
interface to the NF implementation being configured.
1The origin of the word daemon. Available at: http://ei.cs.vt.edu/~history/Daemon.html.
Accessed 14.03.2016
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YANG-as-DSL in which there is no management daemon in the middle, but rather
the NF implementation itself subscribes to listen to configuration events from
the NETCONF datastore and acts upon them directly.
Usually when developing NETCONF based management it is not possible to
use the YANG-as-DSL approach. This is because the NF implementations being
configured are usually external projects that have little or no care for dynamic
network configuration and thus will not merge code for something they do not use
themselves. This is especially problematic until a common API is found to interface
the NETCONF daemon. One of the major findings of the implementation phase of
this thesis was the applicability of AgentX protocol [38] for the use as inter-process
communication (IPC) mechanism between the NETCONF server and management
daemon. Hence, slighly modified AgentX protocol could be a well suited candidate to
offer a unified IPC API even between different NETCONF server implementations
and management daemons.
Therefore, for common development situations only the YANG-to-DSL and YANG-
to-API approaches are applicable and from these two performance-wise the latter
is preferable because it involves less abstraction layers. However, there are not so
many NF implementations that offer a full API to configure the implementation so
in some cases the YANG-to-DSL might be the only viable option. Yet, as for NF
implementations that do offer a full API, the Linux kernel’s Netlink API2 is a fine
example where YANG-to-API approach could be used in management daemon.
5.2 Instrumentation Development
Developing YANG models requires extensive knowledge of the NF being modelled
in order to capture all the essential nuances and in order to make the model concise,
simple and powerful. However, once a model is developed the review and implemen-
tation parts can be made easier with the right tooling.
In this section a de-facto standard tool for handling YANG models is discussed.
The tool’s internal workings are little bit opened and it is explained how this tool
can help reviewing and understanding the YANG models and how it can be utilized
to substantially ease the device- and application developers’ work. In addition, an
example of a typical network instrumentation development workflow is presented.
5.2.1 Development Tools
Currently the de-facto tool to use when modelling and reviewing YANG models and
when developing software based on those models is a program called pyang3. Written
with the Python programming language, the pyang is a small utility program that
is a YANG model validator and language transpiler4.
2Kernel to user communication channel. http://www.linuxfoundation.org/collaborate/
workgroups/networking/netlink. Accessed 02.03.2016
3YANG validator and converter. Available at: https://github.com/mbj4668/pyang.
Accessed 02.03.2016
4Transpiler is a source-to-source compiler that converts input written in one language to output
generated as another language. For example this could mean converting YANG models to Java
programming language.
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The main use case of pyang for modellers and reviewers is its feature to vali-
date YANG models according to the rules defined by YANG specification [22]. This
ability allows users to quickly spot and fix errors in the YANG models under de-
velopment and to validate that no backwards compatibility breakage occurs during
revision bump. An example use of pyang in YANG model development can be seen
in Figure 5.1 which shows a hypothetical revision upgrade to the YANG model for
IP management [27] that removes enumeration from the model, thus breaking the
backwards compatibility rules defined in RFC 6020 [22].
#> pyang --check-update-from=ietf-ip@2014.yang ietf-ip@2016.yang
ietf-ip@2016.yang:121: error: the enum ’dynamic’, defined at
ietf-ip@2014.yang:121 is illegally removed
Figure 5.1: YANG model validation using pyang.
Another useful feature of pyang is the possibility to represent the YANG models
in a much more concise, although less descriptive, tree-format that is easy to com-
prehend quickly. A slightly modified example output of pyang is presented in Figure
5.2 where a module is represented as the top-level element and then the YANG data
definitions within are indented in the tree view with the plus-minus-minus nota-
tion. The letters rw indicate that the given data definition is readable and writable
(configuration), whereas letters ro would indicate that the data definition is only
readable (state). In addition, the keys of list data definitions are shown in brackets,
leaf data definitions with the question mark are considered optional elements and
container data definitions with the exclamation mark implicitly enable the given
functionality if they exist in the datastore.
In addition, as YANG models define an API that model’s users need to follow
precisely, models can be also used to generate code stubs for the device developers to
fill. Code generation can also be extended to generate the custom content validation
code. Many NETCONF server implementations offer transpilers that turn YANG
models into code stubs that are wired to the server implementation automatically
leaving only the actual logic part for the device developer. In fact, also pyang can
work effectively as a transpiler as shown later in this thesis.
5.2.2 Implementing YANG Models
Device developers implementing NF instrumentation using the YANG-to-DSL or
YANG-to-API approaches need to read and comprehend the YANG model of the
NF, then workout the method of how to interface with the NETCONF server im-
plementation and finally convert the internal management daemon presentation to
the format understood by the NF implementation. With YANG-as-DSL approach
the management daemon is not needed and there is no need for conversion from
internal presentation to any other format. These steps in case of YANG-to-DSL
and YANG-to-API approaches are explored with an example of NF instrumentation
presented in this section.
There exist IETF standardized YANG models on how to configure network de-
vice’s interfaces and IP addresses, which are shown in Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3
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using the tree notation generated with the pyang utility program. (IPv6 parts not
shown for brevity.) The interface YANG model provides a basic structure to name
interfaces and control their power status [23]. The IP address YANG model extends
the interface YANG model in a way which resembles the method which most oper-
ating systems use to handle IP addresses, where IP addresses are added to specific
interfaces [27].
module: ietf-interfaces
+--rw interfaces
+--rw interface* [name]
+--rw name
+--rw description?
+--rw type
+--rw enabled?
+--rw link-up-down-trap-enable?
Figure 5.2: A YANG Model for Interface Management. [23]
module: ietf-ip
augment /if:interfaces/if:interface
+--rw ipv4!
+--rw enabled?
+--rw forwarding?
+--rw mtu?
+--rw address* [ip]
| +--rw ip
| +--rw (subnet)
| +--:(prefix-length)
| | +--rw prefix-length?
| +--:(netmask)
| +--rw netmask?
+--rw neighbor* [ip]
+--rw ip
+--rw link-layer-address
Figure 5.3: A YANG Model for IP Management. [27]
By using the API provided by these YANG models, a NETCONF client imple-
mentation can perform configuration operations that modify interface and IP address
configuration in NFs. This kind of transaction would include an edit-config NET-
CONF operation that could for example be something like the operation shown in
Figure 5.4, which modifies an interface called FastEthernet 0/0 containing primary
and secondary IP addresses to illustrate the list YANG data definition.
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<rpc message-id="5" xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<edit-config>
<target>
<candidate/>
</target>
<config>
<top>
<interfaces
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-interfaces"
xmlns:base="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0"
xmlns:ianaift="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:iana-if-type">
<interface base:operation="replace">
<name>FastEthernet 0/0</name>
<description>
WAN Interface connecting to backbone.
</description>
<type>ianaift:ethernetCsmacd</type>
<enabled>true</enabled>
<ipv4
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ip">
<enabled>true</enabled>
<forwarding>true</forwarding>
<mtu>1500</mtu>
<address>
<ip>10.0.1.10</ip>
<prefix-length>24</prefix-length>
</address>
<address>
<ip>10.0.1.11</ip>
<prefix-length>24</prefix-length>
</address>
</ipv4>
</interface>
</interfaces>
</top>
</config>
</edit-config>
</rpc>
Figure 5.4: NETCONF edit-config RPC modifying configuration.
By using these YANG models it is possible to configure all compliant NFs regard-
less of the vendor and version by leaving the responsibility of native representation
to the NF instrumentation. For example, a management daemon configuring a Cisco
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router using its CLI could produce commands such as presented in Figure 5.5 based
on the NETCONF operation presented in Figure 5.4.
> configure terminal
#> interface FastEthernet 0/0
#> no shutdown
#> description "WAN Interface connecting to backbone."
#> mtu 1500
#> ip address 10.0.1.10 255.255.255.0
#> ip address 10.0.1.11 255.255.255.0
#> !
Figure 5.5: NETCONF edit-config operation interpreted in Cisco CLI.
That same NETCONF operation could be interpreted by the management dae-
mon in Linux router using its CLI somewhat differently. For example the CLI
commands could look something like in Figure 5.6.
#> ip link set eth0 up
#> # Linux has no ’description’-field for interfaces.
#> ip link set eth0 mtu 1500
#> ip address add 10.0.1.10/24 dev eth0
#> ip address add 10.0.1.11/24 dev eth0
Figure 5.6: NETCONF edit-config operation interpreted in Linux CLI.
On the other hand, as both of the previous CLI examples represented the YANG-
to-DSL approach, a YANG-to-API approach is presented in Figure 5.7. The figure
shows an example use of the Linux’s Netlink API that can be used to directly commu-
nicate with the NF implementation within the kernel, thus skipping the unnecessary
middle steps required by the CLI making this approach more efficient because there
is no need to fork new processes.
from pyroute2 import IPRoute
ip = IPRoute()
if = ip.link_lookup(ifname="eth0")[0]
ip.link("set", index=if, state="up")
ip.link("set", index=if, mtu=1500)
ip.addr("add", index=if, address="10.0.0.10", mask=24)
ip.addr("add", index=if, address="10.0.0.11", mask=24)
Figure 5.7: NETCONF edit-config operation using Linux Netlink API.
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5.3 Modelling Network Functions
For many NFs there exist already RFCs or drafts that define YANG models for
the NFs’ functionality, but there are also many NFs which have very immature or
non-existent YANG models. For these kind of situations when there is no existing
model but one is required, one needs to take on the role of a YANG modeller.
Another scenario when modelling is required is a need to augment existing models
with additional custom functionality. However, modelling YANG models is not
quite straight forward and requires usually multiple iterations and review runs, for
example the current RFC draft for a YANG model for routing management [30] has
undergone over 20 iteration rounds.
In this chapter the basic workflow of creating YANG models is explored through
the first hand experience of implementing an experimental YANG model for IPsec
management. After the workflow study, the experimental YANG model’s properties
are discussed. Furthermore, a short comparison to the existing draft for IPsec YANG
model is presented.
5.3.1 Modelling Workflow
The first approach to create a YANG model for an NF that has many existing im-
plementations includes studying the configuration syntax of existing NF implemen-
tations. Deriving YANG models from the existing implementations is easy because
the developers who created those configuration syntaxes have had some vision of
how the NF should be configured and have unknowingly already done some ground
work for the YANG modelling. Second approach would be to study the RFCs and
from there generate a completely new interpretation of how the NF should be con-
figured. The third approach is to study the possibly existing SNMP’s MIB modules
for that NF if they exist, which probably contain much of the necessary contents for
a YANG model. Only the first approach was used in this thesis.
When studying the configuration syntax of existing NF implementations the ob-
jective is to find the least common denominator, a set of functionalities they all
implement, which is usually not much larger set of mandatory functionalities than
are defined as MUST in the RFCs defining the NF. When all the common function-
alities are found, the remaining functionalities should be grouped to logical features
that could later be conditionally enabled. These remaining functionalities are usually
defined as SHOULD or MAY in the RFCs defining the NF. After the configuration
syntaxes are analysed it is equally important to go over the RFCs defining the NFs in
order to find out if all the mandatory functionalities are modelled and also separate
the optional functionalities that can later be gated behind if-feature statement in
YANG model so that more advanced implementations can offer the features without
requiring non-standard augmentations.
One more thing to remember when developing YANG models is that it is very
tempting to create a YANG model very close to some specific implementation, mak-
ing it easy to use YANG in that particular implementation, but at the same time
seriously undermining the other implementations that have configuration models
vastly differing from that one specific implementation. Therefore, it is vital that
the developers of different NF implementations would contribute to the modelling
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or review process. However, if it is not possible to form this sort of collaboration,
then the review process should be even more careful and thorough in order not to
incorporate any implementation specific gimmicks into the YANG models.
5.3.2 A YANG Model for IPsec Management
In this thesis an experimental YANG model for IPsec management, which is included
in this thesis as appendix A, was created and the approach of studying existing
configuration syntaxes and deriving the YANG model from those was used. The
IKE implementations studied were OpenIKED5, StongSwan6 and a proprietary IPsec
implementation. A sample of OpenIKED configuration can be seen in Figure 5.8,
which configures an IPsec tunnel between two hosts. The same configuration sample
with StongSwan can be seen in Figure 5.9. All the implementations supported IKEv2
so the experimental YANG model was restricted to that version of the protocol.
ikev2 "student_connection" esp \
from 10.1.1.0/24 to 10.2.2.0/24 \
local 10.0.1.1 peer 10.0.2.1 \
dstid "C=FI,O=TTY,CN=Student Stud"
Figure 5.8: Example of OpenIKED configuration.
conn student_connection
leftsubnet=10.1.1.0/24
left=10.0.1.1
rightsubnet=10.2.2.0/24
right=10.0.2.1
rightid="C=FI,O=TTY,CN=Student Stud"
Figure 5.9: Example of StrongSwan configuration.
When trying to find the least common denominator between the implementations
it became easy to notice functionalities that were missing from some implementations
and thus those could be moved under an if-feature statement. Ultimately all the
implementations boiled down to few concepts: policies and rules. Rules defined a
ordered list of access control rules that would link to policies, which defined the local
and peer identities and security parameters. A tree view of part of the created YANG
model can be seen in Figure 5.10, which shows these common functionalities shared
by the implementations. Unfortunately the YANG model structure was mostly
dominated by the configuration syntax of the proprietary IPsec implementation,
which makes the model harder to integrate with the other implementations.
5IKEv2 implementation. Available at: http://www.openiked.org. Accessed 13.02.2016
6IPsec-based VPN Solution. Available at: https://www.strongswan.org. Accessed 13.02.2016
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module: ipsec
+--rw ipsec
...
+--rw dynamic-policies
| +--rw dynamic-policy* [name]
| +--rw name string
| ...
| +--rw (address-family)?
| | +--:(ipv4)
| | +--rw ipv4
| | +--rw local-ip
| | +--rw remote-ip?
| ...
| +--rw local-id
| | +--rw (identity)?
| | ...
| | +--:(fqdn)
| | +--rw fqdn?
| +--rw remote-id
| +--rw (identity)?
| ...
| +--:(fqdn)
| +--rw fqdn?
|
...
+--rw rules
+--rw rule* [name]
+--rw name
...
+--rw (address-family)?
+--:(ipv4)
+--rw ipv4
+--rw sources
| +--rw source* [ip]
| +--rw protocol?
| +--rw ip
| +--rw port?
+--rw destinations
+--rw destination* [ip]
+--rw protocol?
+--rw ip
+--rw port?
...
Figure 5.10: Snippet of A YANG Model for IPsec Management.
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As noted earlier, there exists a draft YANG model in the IETF’s IPsec workgroup
that also defines a YANG model for IPsec management [39]. The draft model
is a much more comprehensive YANG model containing also IKEv1, state data
definitions and notifications. Also, the draft seems to be modelled using the second
modelling approach of creating a configuration model from scratch based on the
RFCs. Whilst the draft is more comprehensive than the model presented in this
thesis, it is currently at very early stages and it is not possible to create functional
NF instrumentation based on the model yet. However, the YANG model presented
in this thesis should be considered as a slightly naive, albeit working, attempt to
model IKEv2 configuration and the further development of the IETF draft should
be fully endorsed. As a further research goal it would be interesting to attempt to
implement an NF instrumentation based on the IETF draft and that way review
and provide feedback for the draft model to develop it further.
6 PROTOTYPE NETCONF SERVER
Whilst there are many implementations of NETCONF servers, they are all imple-
mented in C programming language, which is reasonable because usually the server
needs to operate on resource constrained environments, but also requires a thor-
ough understanding of the C internals and prudent software development practices
to get the implementations secure. Some implementations also create a very tight
coupling with the input, processing and NF instrumentation by compiling the NF
instrumentation into the server logic. This approach makes the servers vulnerable
for software errors that might occur on the NF instrumentation and forces all the
code to run with the same privileges which means in any Unix-like operating sys-
tem almost certainly the need to run the whole monolithic implementation as the
administrator user.
Partly to address these security and reliability issues and partly to get a deeper
understanding on what goes into a NETCONF server implementation, a new proto-
type implementation was created as part of this thesis. The implementation utilizes
a modular event-driven asynchronous design, follows multiple security principles and
was implemented using the Python programming language. The prototype did not
include all the parts presented in the architecture, but it contained enough logic
to provide a testbed to convert the southbound NETCONF messages into internal
representation and to be passed onto the management daemons that converted those
into NF configuration files. The prototype is specific to Unix-like operating systems
in design and thus can not easily be converted to other types of operating systems.
The prototype architecture was greatly inspired by the process architecture used in
OpenBSD system daemons such as OpenBGPD1 and OpenNTPD2.
In this chapter the software architecture of the prototype implementation is dis-
cussed, with focus being on the process interaction and standard conformance. The
modularity of the prototype is discussed in its own section and the AgentX protocol’s
suitability to this task is explained. In addition, the security aspects of the architec-
ture are presented to provide view on how NETCONF server implementations can
be further secured atop of the protocol’s security measures.
6.1 Software Architecture
The existing NETCONF server implementations have some documentation about
the server architecture, but they contain very little information about the design
decisions that resulted the architecture. One of the major focus areas of this thesis
implementation was to gather experience and knowledge of achievable modularity
and security aspects of a NETCONF server. This knowledge can help to reason for
1BGP routing daemon. Available at: http://www.openbgpd.org/. Accessed 10.03.2016
2NTP server daemon. Available at: http://www.openntpd.org/. Accessed 10.03.2016
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and against some of the features offered by NETCONF.
In this section an overview of the architecture is given by presenting a diagram
showing the interaction between different components and explaining each compo-
nent’s purpose. Furthermore, the prototype’s standard conformance resulting from
the made design choices is reasoned about.
6.1.1 Architecture Overview
The NETCONF server prototype created in this thesis is split into multiple com-
ponents running as separate processes in order to better confine privileges required
by the different parts of the system. The prototype architecture contains six com-
ponents that are required to implement the NETCONF server functionality. These
components are:
parent, which is a simple process used to manage the other components (except
control). It is required to run as administrator user to be able to make system
wide modifications.
control, which is a command line utility to interact with the parent process in
order control the NETCONF server. It can be used for example to restart the
NETCONF server.
server, which performs the user authentication and spawns new subsystems for
each NETCONF session triggered by the transport protocol and passes the
received data to them.
subsystem, which performs the parsing of data coming from the server and con-
verts it into messages towards the engine. The most NETCONF capability
and XML handling logic is confined within this component.
engine, which is the component that contains the bulk of the NETCONF logic
as it holds the system datastores and performs actions on them based on
messages received from subsystems, performs the NACM checks and triggers
events based on datastore changes to the daemons.
daemon, more precisely management daemon, which is the component that con-
verts the messages from the engine into the NF instrumentation. There can
be multiple of different daemons that can run as separate users and can be
limited in access the same way as subsystems.
An overview of the architecture is shown in Figure 6.1. The inter-process com-
munication (IPC) utilizes three different approaches which are signals, custom IPC3
and a slightly modified AgentX protocol [38]. The signals are used between com-
ponents that require very little interaction with the parent (server and daemons).
The custom IPC is used over Unix-sockets between components that need to ex-
change simple one-way messages between each other (control, parent and engine).
The AgentX protocol is used over Unix-sockets between components that require
transaction support (subsystems, engine and daemons).
3A IPC framework called imsg borrowed from the OpenBSD daemons.
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Figure 6.1: An overview of the prototype architecture.
The prototype attempts to make the API between subsystems and engine as
simple as possible. With this architecture it is possible to move most of the func-
tionality, that depends on capabilities supported by NETCONF clients, into the
confined subsystem component that can be extensively limited in functionality and
is always access controlled by the engine. Most of the capabilities and features of-
fered in NETCONF do not need to complicate the design of the engine which can
be made entirely by the rules of the most complex configuration. Furthermore, the
prototype does away with XML as quickly as it can since, while XML is a good
format to serialize data, it is unnecessarily complex for the server’s internal use and
deemed too large attack surface to use in the privileged components of the server.
In addition to the runtime components described earlier, the prototype used also
the popular open source YANG model validator and transpiler pyang to transpile
YANG models into Python source code with a custom plugin integrated into the
pyang plugin-framework. This plugin allowed for automatic code generation for
the syntax and semantic validation that is required to ensure the integrity of the
datastores within the engine component.
6.1.2 Standard Conformance
The prototype strived for a high standard conformance with the xpath and url capa-
bilities being the only ones not supported, since they were deemed too large attack
surface to the protocol compared to the functionalities they bring. The xpath capa-
bility was dropped due to the fact that XML processing is limited to the subsystem
component and would have been challenging and error prone to implement without
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XML support within the engine. In addition, the xpath capability was evaluated
to offer only minor benefits compared to the subtree filtering mechanism. The url
capability was dropped because whilst storing configurations to arbitrary local files
might have been useful, it was deemed not to be the NETCONF server’s responsi-
bility to connect and store configurations over the network, since this functionality
could easily be achieved by the client.
The support for main features are listed in Table 6.1 which lists the most promi-
nent capabilities and features currently standardized for NETCONF. The TLS trans-
port functionality was not pursued with this implementation. However, the archi-
tecture does not limit the possibility of adding TLS transport functionality later on
since even the standard emphasizes transport layer agnosticism.
Table 6.1: Prototype features and capabilities
Feature /
Capability Supported?
writeable-running yes
candidate yes
confirmed-commit yes
rollback-on-error yes
validate yes
distinct-startup yes
url no
xpath no
notification yes
with-defaults yes
partial-lock no
callhome yes
tls no
ssh yes
6.2 Modular Design
Since the NF instrumentation is split to multiple different components, it is safer to
test and modify individual components without impact on the other components.
Another good thing about modular design is that defects in the management dae-
mons, made by device developers, which contain complex NF specific logic do not
bring down the whole system, but are rather isolated to that given management
daemon.
In this section the most fundamental design decisions that enable the modularity
of the system are discussed. In order to convert the variable sized XML tags to a
fixed internal representation a new identification scheme was developed. In addition,
an existing IPC protocol called AgentX was found to be a suitable IPC mechanism
for NETCONF servers. Furthermore, a technique used in the subsystem component
to perform operations in an uniform way towards the engine component regardless
of the supported capabilities of the NETCONF client is explained.
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6.2.1 Object Identifiers and Keys
In the attempt to get rid of the XML as early as possible a new convention to identify
the operations, notifications and data nodes was needed. In the prototype a new
method of converting the XML namespaces and tags into 32-bit object identification
(OID) values was created. The method used in OID calculation is fairly simple: pick
a random key at build time that using a predefined hash function generates a unique
value for every data definition in the YANG model and if a collision occurs pick a
new key and start over. Using this method of calculating OIDs as shown in Figure
6.2, it is possible to refer to any data definition in the structure uniquely as 32-bit
number that can be used very efficiently in hash table lookups. This method has
one drawback as it limits the amount of possible data definitions4 because collisions
can become so probable that the build times become unbearable. However, since
YANG models tend to contain less than 100 data definitions each this is not deemed
a significant problem.
hash = hmac.new(key=b’xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx’)
hash.update(b’urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-interfaces’)
hash.update(b’interfaces’)
hash.update(b’urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-interfaces’)
hash.update(b’interface’)
oid = hash.digest()[:4]
Figure 6.2: Object Identifier calculation for /if:interfaces/if:interface
However, since YANG supports lists and leaf-lists that are identified by their keys
another mechanism is also required to distinct those values from each other. For
that purpose the following method was used: pick a random key at runtime and use
that to hash the key values into a 128-bit value that uniquely identifies a single key
value. This approach allows for fixed length key identifiers with the very slight risk5
of possible collisions. The mechanism is shown in Figure 6.3.
hash = hmac.new(key=b’yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy’)
hash.update(b’eth0’)
key = hash.digest()[:16]
Figure 6.3: Key calculation for /if:interfaces/if:interface[’eth0’]
By combining the key and OID values it is possible to uniquely identify any
instance of any data definition in the datastore with a 20 byte long identifier. Yet,
4The probability of randomly generating k integers with value less than N without collisions is
1−e k(k−1)2N , which yields probability of about 68.78% when using 32-bit OIDs in NF instrumentation
with hundred thousand data definitions.
5The probability of randomly generating k integers with value less than N without collisions is
1− e k(k−1)2N , which yields probability of about 0.15% when using 128-bit keys in list with quintillion
(1018) different values.
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it should be noted that depending on the depth of the datastore tree structure, one
needs to concatenate these 20 byte identifiers for each layer. So for example a data
node in depth of 8 would need 160 bytes to identify its location in the structure,
but now with fixed length it is possible for an implementation to define maximum
supported depth of datastores so that for example 200 bytes is reserved for the
identifier and datastore can thus be no deeper than 10 layers.
6.2.2 AgentX Protocol
A little surprisingly during the implementation of the prototype NETCONF server it
was observed that accompanying IPC protocol for SNMP, AgentX protocol [38], was
almost a prefect match for the needs of NETCONF server. The AgentX protocol was
standardized in 1998 [40] and later updated in 2000 [38]. The RFC was developed
by Daniele et al. [38] to facilitate extensible design where subagents, equal to the
daemons in the prototype architecture, that can dynamically extend the master
agent, equal to the engine in the prototype architecture. The motivation for AgentX
protocol is to provide a common API between the agents and thus alleviate NF
vendors’ problems of supporting multiple different platforms [38].
When using the AgentX protocol the engine process sends and receives the NET-
CONF protocol messages but has no access to the NF instrumentation directly. The
access to NF instrumentation is provided by zero or more daemon processes, which
do not see any of the NETCONF protocol messages, but interact with the engine
process using the AgentX protocol. The internal use of AgentX protocol is not seen
by the NETCONF clients in any way. [38]
The NETCONF protocol operations map quite nicely to the AgentX protocol
PDUs when used between the engine and the daemon components. Table 6.2 shows
the mappings where the component which initiates an operation is seen in the left-
most column and the PDUs that this operation would translate to is seen in the
rightmost column. The mappings leave open the mechanism how AgentX can be
used to execute custom RPCs.
Table 6.2: Daemon mappings between NETCONF and AgentX
Initiator NETCONF Operation AgentX PDU
engine get Get
engine validate TestSet, CleanupSet
engine edit-config TestSet
engine (confirmed-)commit CommitSet
engine commit CleanupSet
engine cancel-commit UndoSet, CleanupSet
engine custom-rpcs -
daemon notification Notify
Perhaps more surprisingly the NETCONF protocol operations also map to the
AgentX protocol PDUs when used between the subsystem and engine components.
Table 6.3 shows the mappings where the component which initiates an operation is
seen in the leftmost column and the PDUs that this operation would translate to is
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seen in the rightmost column. However, using AgentX protocol in this context would
require also a mechanism to implicate a start and end of NETCONF operation, since
the engine component requires that information in order to perform NACM checks.
The mappings leave open the mechanism how AgentX can be used to execute custom
RPCs.
Table 6.3: Subsystem mappings between NETCONF and AgentX
Initiator NETCONF Operation AgentX PDU
subsystem open-session Open
subsystem start-operation -
subsystem get Get
subsystem get-config Get
subsystem validate TestSet, CleanupSet
subsystem edit-config TestSet
subsystem delete-config TestSet, CommitSet, CleanupSet
subsystem (confirmed-)commit CommitSet
subsystem commit CleanupSet
subsystem cancel-commit UndoSet, CleanupSet
subsystem subscribe Register
subsystem unsubscribe Unregister
subsystem lock -
subsystem unlock -
subsystem kill-session -
subsystem copy-config -
subsystem custom-rpcs -
subsystem end-operation -
subsystem close-session Close
engine notification Notify
Clearly the AgentX protocol could be quite easily converted for the needs of
NETCONF protocol and this conversion would most likely lower the barrier needed
to implement NETCONF based services, because existing NF instrumentation im-
plementations could be ported to use the new management protocol more easily.
Notable additions needed for the protocol would be the ability to handle dynamic
object identifiers and the ability to relay remote procedure calls to the daemons.
The current prototype architecture requires the engine component to be aware of
all YANG models, but as further research goal it would be interesting to see if the ar-
chitecture could be modified to allow a YANG model agnostic approach as intended
by the AgentX protocol specification.
6.2.3 Capability Unification
In order to simplify the engine component’s design, the subsystem component unifies
the operations received from NETCONF clients to a single common way of handling
transactions; this process is defined here as capability unification. The capability
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unification basically means that all NETCONF operations are performed in the
same way as their most complex counterpart.
The most complex example of the capability unification is the unification of edit-
config operation defined by the writeable-running capability, which is so primitive
operation that it requires five extra steps internally to match the most complex
edit-config operation defined by the confirmed-commit capability. The edit-config
operation in this mode is converted internally to the five operations shown in Table
6.4, where the operation internally first calls for lock on the candidate datastore, then
edits the locked datastore, performs confirmed-commit, finalizes the commit, copies
the datastore as the startup datastore and finally unlocks the candidate datastore.
However, if the client advertises the startup capability then the copy-config operation
will not be performed and the responsibility is left to the client.
Table 6.4: Unification of writable-running capability
External External Internal Internal
Operations Target Operations Target
edit-config running lock candidate
- - edit-config candidate
- - (confirmed-)commit candidate → running
- - commit candidate
- - copy-config running → startup
- - unlock candidate
Another example of slightly less complex unification procedure is given in Table
6.5, where the edit-config operation defined by the candidate capability is slightly
extended to include the confirmed-commit and the copy-config operations internally.
In this case it is the commit operation that is expanded into multiple operations.
However, if the client advertises the startup capability then the copy-config operation
will not be performed and the responsibility is left to the client.
Table 6.5: Unification of candidate capability
External External Internal Internal
Operations Target Operations Target
lock candidate lock candidate
edit-config candidate edit-config candidate
commit candidate (confirmed-)commit candidate → running
- - commit candidate
- - copy-config running → startup
unlock candidate unlock candidate
In addition to capability unification, some operations can be reduced to a minimal
functionality from engine component’s point of view. One such operation is get-
config, which can contain multiple subtree filters but the subsystem component can
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convert each filter into an individual query as shown in Table 6.6 and concatenate
the results together without requiring the engine component to know anything about
the performed filtering.
Table 6.6: Splitting of subtree-filters into multiple operations
External External Internal Internal
Operations Target Operations Target
get-config running get-config running
filter1 filter1
filter2
filter3
get-config running
filter2
get-config running
filter3
6.3 Security Measures
Since the management API is arguably the most critical part of the system in terms
of security, much care must be taken to ensure that it can not be exploited. The
prototype implementation created in this thesis explores various possibilities to limit
the impact that even an authenticated user can achieve on the system. It is preva-
lent for a NETCONF server to prove robust and secure approach against attacks
performed by authenticated users since it offers the NACM functionality that can
be potentially used to provide a limited management API to the same system by
multiple users of different organizations in case there is a need to share resources.
The security measures envisioned for the prototype architecture include extensive
privilege separation, establishment of resource limits and process sandboxing. These
are additions on top of the security features offered by the NETCONF standard and
do not affect the standard compliance of the implementation. Although, there are
many security measures in place, they naturally can not mitigate all possible security
problems such as logic errors in NF instrumentation, but they can greatly reduce the
attack surface exposed by the NETCONF server and provide security in different
layers that augment the security provided by the NETCONF protocol itself.
6.3.1 Privilege Separation
In 2003 Provos et al. [41] presented a concept called privilege separation that is a
mitigation technique designed to prevent security vulnerabilities from being abused
for privilege escalation. Privilege escalation means the process where user running
with limited privileges can abuse a vulnerability to gain more privileges, which in the
worst case would be gaining the administrator privileges to the operating system [41].
This limits the risk imposed by security vulnerabilities so that even if an attacker
gets full control of a vulnerable process, the attacker is limited by the privileges of
the user that the process is running as [41]. Privilege separation requires the software
to be designed to run as multiple processes with different privileges separated by
6. Prototype NETCONF Server 61
internal trust boundaries. Privilege separation has proven to be effective design in
order to mitigate security vulnerabilities [41].
In the prototype implementation the subsystem, engine and daemon processes are
designed to utilize privilege separation and all are intended to be running as separate
users with very limited access to the underlying system. Whereas the parent process
runs as administrator and handles operations that need administrator privileges such
as modifying the NETCONF user credentials. For example the XML parsing is done
by the subsystem processes running as an ordinary user on the system and if there
would be a vulnerability in this XML parsing giving the attacker full control of the
subsystem process it would still be running as an ordinary user with very limited
access to the system. This confinement can be further enhanced by the sandboxing
techniques discussed in later in this section.
Privilege separation in the case of NETCONF server implementation requires
also a method of passing the user credentials on to the engine process, since it
performs the NACM checks. In the prototype implementation the authentication
between processes is achieved with a function called getpeereid, which is possible to
implement on most Unix-like operating systems. The function basically operates by
asking from a Unix-socket for the credentials of the program on the other end of
the socket. Since Unix-sockets are local sockets, operating system is able to provide
the effective user identity of the program. Thus, in the engine process we can trust
what the operating system tells as the user information of the subsystem and daemon
processes.
6.3.2 Resource Limits
Operating systems have multiple different resources available for the processes run-
ning on top of them. These resources include processors, memory, network interfaces
and hard drives to name few. Every process on the system share these resources and
thus they are a potential attack vector for denial of service attacks. One common
attack against systems is resource exhaustion that can be caused by very trivially6
if there is no mechanism to limit the impact.
In the prototype implementation the processes handling user data are all designed
to be run as separate users. Therefore, further restrictions can be placed upon these
processes in terms of resource limits. Users on Unix-like operating systems can be
limited to certain amount of CPU, amount of memory, number of processes and
other resources and since the prototype is designed to run as separate users these
can be enforced quite strictly without impact on overall performance. Another
complementary approach to limiting resources is to limit the allowed connections of
a given user in the server process. In addition to these measures, the NETCONF
implementation should have a configurable upper limit for YANG list and leaf-list
expressions since these could be otherwise used to employ denial of service attacks
by malicious users.
6One example is the fork bomb attack which creates infinite amount of new processes until the
operating system runs out of resources.
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6.3.3 Restricted Operation
Traditional model of software development has been to give all processes running
with the same privileges the same set of available operations. However, usually
processes do not need to perform most of the operations available to them by de-
fault. Restricted operation refers to the mitigation technique that limits the avail-
able operations of the program to the limited set defined by the program’s devel-
oper. Restricted operation mode is available on operating systems such as Linux and
OpenBSD. Linux offers a seccomp-bpf 7 and OpenBSD pledge8 mechanisms which can
be used to limit the system calls that a process can call. An example of seccomp-bpf
code can be seen in Figure 6.4, which limits the process that runs it to be able to
only perform input and output operations and stop execution, any other system
call would lead to the process termination. An example of pledge can be seen in
Figure 6.5, where the process is limited to similar subset of operations as with the
seccomp-bpf example.
from seccomp import *
def apply_seccomp(server_sock, engine_sock):
filter = SyscallFilter(defaction=seccomp.KILL)
filter.add_rule(ALLOW, "read", Arg(0, EQ, server_sock))
filter.add_rule(ALLOW, "write", Arg(0, EQ, server_sock))
filter.add_rule(ALLOW, "read", Arg(0, EQ, engine_sock))
filter.add_rule(ALLOW, "write", Arg(0, EQ, engine_sock))
...
filter.add_rule(ALLOW, "rt_sigreturn")
filter.load()
...
apply_seccomp(server_sock, engine_sock)
Figure 6.4: Restricting allowed operations in Linux
from pledge import pledge
if not pledge("stdio"):
raise SecurityException("Unable to pledge() the process.")
Figure 6.5: Restricting allowed operations in OpenBSD
7SECure COMPuting with filters. Available at: https://www.kernel.org/doc/
Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt. Accessed 10.03.2016
8System call to restrict system operations. Available at: http://man.openbsd.org/
OpenBSD-current/man2/pledge.2. Accessed 10.03.2016
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The extensive use of privilege separation in the prototype implementation allows
very fine-grained restrictions of the available system calls to the different compo-
nents. For example the subsystem component only needs to read and write from
its inputs to its outputs and perform some internal logic, but it requires no net-
work access and no filesystem access, hence it could restrict itself to only those
operations by using the same pledge call as show in Figure 6.5. After restricting
the operations the subsystem component will not be able to access the filesystem,
open network connections nor call other executables to name few restrictions. These
restrictions further mitigate the possible security vulnerabilities that might exist in
the subsystem component which holds the potentially error-prone XML processing
and capability unification logic.
7 ANALYSIS OF YANG AND NETCONF
So far this thesis has focused on the different aspects of network management and
how YANG and NETCONF perform the tasks related to it. In addition, a lot of
implementation specific insights were explored in order to better understand and val-
idate the claims driving the NETCONF protocol. Now on this chapter the intention
is to gather the information written in the previous chapters and use that to analyse
the network management capabilities offered by YANG and NETCONF. The inten-
tion of this analysis is to provide feedback whether YANG and NETCONF would
be viable options to consider when implementing network management solutions.
This chapter starts with an comparison of the YANG and NETCONF based
network management solution to the network management solutions presented in the
second chapter in regards of the new rising network management paradigms NFV
and SDN. In addition, the YANG and NETCONF based management solution is
evaluated using a SWOT analysis based on the information gathered in the previous
chapters in combination with insights from other research articles concerning the
same subject.
7.1 Comparing Network Management Solutions
All of the network management solutions described in this thesis offer a different set
of network management capabilities with their own strengths and weaknesses. These
capabilities can be compared with each other to get an understanding what aspects
of network management each of them try to achieve and how well they achieve those
aspects.
In this section a simple comparison of the techniques that compete in the net-
work management space is drawn. The comparisons are carried out in the scope of
enabling NFV and enabling SDN. Enabling NFV describes how well given network
management solution meets the management requirements of NFV (scalability, man-
ageability, reliability and security). Enabling SDN describes how well given network
management solution achieves the principles set by the SDN paradigm (separation
of control- and data plane, logically centralized control, open interfaces, programma-
bility). The scale of the comparison ranges from being completely agnostic to the
paradigm to fully enabling the paradigm. Furthermore, the comparison is split to
two parts where the first part covers the network configuration capabilities and the
second part covers the network monitoring capabilities.
7.1.1 Network Configuration Capabilities
The possibility to dynamically configure the network is required to support the
NFV and SDN paradigms. Some network configuration solutions presented in this
thesis are not capable of delivering to the dynamic needs of these new network
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paradigms, whereas some solutions just lack the adoption. In addition, aspects such
as scalability, security and openness of the configuration interfaces matter for these
paradigms and can be used to compare the solutions accordingly.
In Figure 7.1 the traditional CLI and configuration, SNMP, OpenFlow and NET-
CONF based network configuration approaches are scattered across a diagram that
attempts to describe their orientation in respect to the new emerging network man-
agement paradigms SDN and NFV.
OpenFlow
SNMP
NETCONF
CLI /
Config
Enabling
NFV
NFV
Agnostic
SDN
Agnostic
Enabling 
SDN
Figure 7.1: Configuration capabilities regarding NFV and SDN
The network configuration approaches’ positions in the diagram can be explained as
follows:
CLI / Config - The traditional network configuration approaches such as CLIs
and configuration files are pretty much agnostic of the NFV and SDN. These
approaches do not per se impede the new network paradigms, but they do not
enable them either.
SNMP - SNMP offers some possibilities of open and interoperable interface for
both SDN and NFV, but SNMP lacks the configuration models and has no
serious push by the industry to become a standard way of configuring NFs.
Hence, SNMP based network configuration is not very prominent enabler of
these paradigms.
OpenFlow - OpenFlow is especially designed SDN in mind and basically is the
de-facto low-level SDN management protocol, but pure SDN enabled networks
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have yet to be realized and it is not even clear if everything happening in the
network can be made into a clear cut of flows and controller logic thus leaving
a gap in network configuration regarding the NFV.
NETCONF - NETCONF can be seen as an enabler for NFV as it is mainly focused
on NF configuration. Despite NETCONF does not embrace the SDN’s princi-
ple of strict data and control plane separation, NETCONF can be considered
to enable SDN because it opens up the NFs’ configuration to the controller in
an open and centrally controllable and programmable way.
7.1.2 Monitoring Capabilities
The possibility to actively monitor the network is required to support the NFV and
SDN paradigms. Some network monitoring solutions presented in this thesis are
not capable of delivering to the needs of these new network management paradigms.
In addition, aspects such as scalability, security and openness of the monitoring
interfaces matter for these paradigms and can be used to compare the solutions
accordingly.
In Figure 7.2 the logging, IPFIX, NETCONF, SNMP and OpenFlow based net-
work monitoring approaches are scattered across a diagram that attempts to describe
their orientation in respect to the new emerging network management paradigms
SDN and NFV.
Enabling
NFV
OpenFlowSNMP
NETCONF
Logging
IPFIX
NFV
Agnostic
SDN
Agnostic
Enabling 
SDN
Figure 7.2: Monitoring capabilities regarding NFV and SDN
The network monitoring approaches’ positions in the diagram can be explained as
follows:
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Logging - The use of ordinary logging of NF activity is very agnostic of SDN and
NFV and does not really enable nor impede these technologies and serves more
of as status quo than an enabler.
IPFIX - IPFIX is a very lightweight protocol and can be expanded to do traffic
monitoring in a scalable way, which serves as an enabler for NFV. Furthermore,
IPFIX does share the flow based view of the network that is also proposed
by SDN, thus it provides monitoring mechanisms that can be used in SDN
environments.
NETCONF - NETCONF has many useful features for monitoring NFs that enable
both NFV and SDN and could maybe used in conjunction with other protocols
to create even more effective monitoring capabilities. However, used alone
NETCONF is quite resource hungry approach for monitoring, which is usually
aspired to be pretty simple lightweight process.
SNMP - SNMP is currently the de-facto monitoring protocol and it is quite a bit
more lightweight than NETCONF whilst offering most of the same monitoring
capabilities and hence it is slightly better at enabling these new technologies.
OpenFlow - OpenFlow is designed with SDN in mind and largely moves the moni-
toring into the control plane and thus enables extensive monitoring capabilities
for SDN, but as said earlier does not take into account other NF uses cases so
well that it would enable all kinds of NFV scenarios.
7.2 SWOT Analysis
SWOT analysis is a method to evaluate the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities
and threats of a solution in terms of the intended objective. The strengths describe
the advantages of the solution over other alternatives. The weaknesses describe the
disadvantages of the solution compared to other alternatives. The opportunities
describe the changes in the problem space that could promote the solution. The
threats describe the changes in the problem space that could hinder the solution.
The solution being evaluated in this section is the subject of this thesis, namely:
the YANG and NETCONF based network management solution. And the objective
is to determine whether this solution offers an efficient, secure and reliable way
to dynamically manage networks. These two form together the question that this
evaluation tries to answer and that question is:
Is the network management solution offered by YANG and NETCONF
an efficient, secure and reliable way to dynamically manage NFs?
7.2.1 Strengths
The strengths of YANG and NETCONF based network management solutions are
the features and capabilities that offer a distinct advantage by using this solution
compared to some of the other solutions. These strengths are illustrated at various
chapters of this thesis and on research papers concerning YANG and NETCONF:
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Standardized open interface - NETCONF and YANG are standardized solu-
tions that have well defined specifications and are widely understood. Fur-
thermore, they provide the open interface that is considered vital for new
emerging network technologies such as SDN and NFV. Compared to custom
management solutions such as CLI this is a great advantage as the develop-
ment and testing tools can be shared and interoperability can be reached more
easily. The capability to create interoperable APIs between different hardware
and software vendors opens up possibilities to operate highly complex networks
with just one or few solutions, which in turn greatly reduces costs and effort
required to create network management systems.
Extendibility and programmability - There are already many viable YANG
models that can be used to implement and configure NFs’ basic networking
functionality in a completely implementation independent way and creation
of new and augmenting of existing YANG models is possible as shown in this
thesis. In addition, the NETCONF protocol and YANG models are very exten-
sible, allowing standardized and custom implementations to coexist within the
same framework. Furthermore, NETCONF offers an RPC based management
interface that can be easily used programmatically.
Security and reliability - One thing that makes NETCONF stand out amongst
network management solutions is its many built-in security mechanisms. NET-
CONF offers a very comprehensive toolkit to limit NETCONF users’ access
and modification rights using the NACM functionality. In addition, NET-
CONF mandates transport layer security, which makes it secure by default,
which is important considering the criticality of management interface. Fur-
thermore, the security measures presented in this thesis’ prototype NETCONF
implementation show that the protocol design allows for even further security
enhancements to be built into the implementation. And on top of these secu-
rity measures, NETCONF is a connection oriented protocol with documented
and concise error reporting API that allows a very reliable management inter-
face even when errors occur, which is harder to achieve on network manage-
ment approaches such as SNMP.
Full management solution - While NETCONF is prominent in network config-
uration it also incorporates many network monitoring capabilities that can be
utilized to extensively monitor NFs. All these network management capabil-
ities can be accessed using a single session, keeping the resources needed to
manage NFs relatively low. This means that it is possible to achieve full net-
work management using only NETCONF, which is not possible with most of
the other presented network management solutions.
Performance and scalability - Hedstrom et al. [42] compared NETCONF’s and
SNMP’s transaction performance and found out that with small number of
managed NFs SNMP performed more efficiently, but as the networks grew
larger NETCONF scaled better. Also, da Paz Ferraz Santos et al. [43] com-
pared NETCONF and SNMP performance and their results indicate much
better scalability of NETCONF compared to SNMP as the network sizes grow.
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In addition, using the YANG-to-API and YANG-as-DSL approaches presented
in this thesis when integrating to NF instrumentation can greatly decrease the
overall time it takes to configure and deploy NFs compared to the manual
approaches.
Integration to existing systems - Unlike full-blown SDN solutions like Open-
Flow, NETCONF offers an easy way to integrate with existing systems with
the YANG-to-DSL and YANG-to-API approaches presented in this thesis,
thus offering a solution that can be used to transition smoothly to the new
network management paradigms whilst still using the old battle-proven NF
implementations.
7.2.2 Weaknesses
The weaknesses of YANG and NETCONF based network management solutions are
the functionalities that leave the solution in a disadvantage compared to some of the
other solutions. These weaknesses are illustrated at various chapters of this thesis
and on research papers concerning YANG and NETCONF:
Verbose - One of the problems in NETCONF is the fact that it is by design very
verbose because it uses XML as its serialization method. Whilst XML is proven
technology with lots of merits, a study by da Paz Ferraz Santos et al. [43] has
shown that NETCONF consumes even up to ten times more bandwidth com-
pared to SNMP in certain scenarios. This problem can somewhat be alleviated
by compressing the NETCONF messages using the transportation layer com-
pression mechanisms. It has been studied by Augeri et al. [44] that XML
is highly compressible language that can usually be compressed to around
tenth of its original size. These results hold especially true for YANG-based
XML that is mainly just very structured textual configuration. Nevertheless,
with or without compression NETCONF usually consumes higher amount of
bandwidth when compared to alternatives such as SNMP or IPFIX.
Adoption - The current challenge faced by NETCONF is its lack of adoption in
open source development. There is only one open source implementation ac-
tively developed and its use seems to be low. Also the lack of standardized
YANG models for the most used NFs hinder the adoption of NETCONF, but
this problem might be alleviated if the YANG models currently in draft stages
will be standardized in the near future. Alternatives such as OpenFlow and
SNMP have much wider array of implementations available to use.
Efficiency - Since NETCONF was designed to offer full network management ca-
pabilities it has had to make compromises in terms of efficiency. This has
mainly made NETCONF’s monitoring capabilities quite resource consuming
compared to solutions that are mainly concerned with network monitoring
such as IPFIX. And due to the same reason some of the network management
features could be handled more efficiently by other protocols as is done by
the OpenFlow protocol. This all leads to the conclusion that by incorporating
both parts of network management extensively, NETCONF has become sort
of jack of all trades, master of none.
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7.2.3 Opportunities
The opportunities of YANG and NETCONF based network management solutions
are the descriptions of changes in the environment that could positively affect the
solution. These opportunities are illustrated at various chapters of this thesis:
Interoperation - One of the big promises of YANG and NETCONF is the inter-
operability that opens up opportunities to decouple the network management
system developers from the NF developers and allow a clean API that can be
used to operate different NFs using the same set of methods. This in turn
enables new markets as network management systems can be used to control
wider range of networks and NFs can be deployed more easily on different kind
of networks without large learning curve.
Collaboration - There is currently a lot of activity to standardize YANG models
in the IETF work groups and these will produce a standardized configuration
API with unparalleled scope to date. In addition, international companies
such as Cisco Systems Inc. are pushing the NETCONF adoption forward to
enable dynamic network management1. All this activity around YANG and
NETCONF enable collaboration between different vendors by using the same
set of tools to test and deploy network management solutions.
SDN and NFV - If the SDN and NFV network paradigms emerge as successful,
widely used technologies, then the NF vendors that offer open and interopera-
ble interfaces will have major advantage against closed proprietary solutions.
Should this happen, network operators will likely start to demand for NFs to
integrate to their logically centralized controllers and NFs to be dynamically
configurable and easy to monitor to better utilize the infrastructure and cut
costs.
7.2.4 Threats
The threats of YANG and NETCONF based network management solutions are the
descriptions of changes in the environment that could negatively affect the solution.
These threats are illustrated at various chapters of this thesis:
Full-blown SDN - Whilst NETCONF serves as an enabler for SDN it is not fully
in line with the greater vision of SDN, which is a fully programmable network
with no control logic embedded in the network infrastructure itself. Instead
NETCONF offers concept cited in this thesis as dynamic control plane, which
enables dynamic control of NFs whilst keeping the control logic within the
network infrastructure. To achieve fully programmable networks there exists
already protocols like OpenFlow that can control NFs as if they were scattered
network of packet processors and this is something NETCONF is not designed
to compete with. However, it is unlikely that all or even most of the network
infrastructure would fully convert to full-blown SDN and thus there is probably
1Cisco Accelerates Greater Adoption of Network Programmability. Available at: http://www.
tail-f.com/cisco-accelerates-greater-adoption-of-network/. Accessed 02.04.2016
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need for protocols like NETCONF for decades to come. However, in the future
it is a viable threat that NETCONF could become obsolete because of this.
Insufficient adoption - Another threat that NETCONF faces is that the develop-
ment efforts of YANG models could stall before many of the vital YANG mod-
els are finished, leaving the open interface promises of YANG and NETCONF
unfulfilled. Currently there is quite a push due to NFV and SDN transition to
develop these models but standardization of these models is a long process and
other solutions might come along and replace the NETCONF based solutions.
Change reluctance - Lastly one threat that affects nearly all changes from the
status quo is the change reluctance. Network administrators have long oper-
ated their networks using the old methods and have invested a lot of time and
effort on systems that are incompatible with the approach that YANG and
NETCONF offer. It will take some persuasion to get users and developers to
adopt a new way to manage networks and to incorporate NETCONF based
solutions. If the NETCONF based network management’s strengths are not
valued enough and the weaknesses are deemed too severe, it might be rejected
by the community.
7.2.5 SWOT Summary
This section first described the strengths and weaknesses of using a YANG and
NETCONF based network management solution. As a summary it could be said
that this solution offers many benefits to network management that can boost pro-
ductivity, make network management more secure and reliable, cut operational costs
and reduce configuration errors. Furthermore, the identified weaknesses such as high
resource utilization are not severe and can be dealt with in modern networks.
The latter part of this section described the opportunities and threats of this
network management solution. Possibly the most important opportunity offered by
this solution is the smooth transition from traditional networks to the new network
designs driven by the SDN and NFV paradigms. The other opportunities highlight
the enabled collaboration that, when embraced, could offer a win-win situation for
all parties developing YANG and NETCONF based solutions. However, the threats
such as insufficient adoption should not be underestimated since this solution does
not offer nearly all its potential if it remains as a niche technology.
8 CONCLUSIONS
Network administrators today have many capable network monitoring solutions
available, but reacting to the changes in the network remains manual and slow.
This thesis started off by exploring the existing network management solutions which
clearly emphasise network monitoring capabilities over network configuration capa-
bilities. Favouring of network monitoring capabilities is understandable because
network configuration is hard, in fact much harder and error-prone than network
monitoring. Network configuration is hard because it requires two-way collabora-
tion between the network controller and the network device with the risk of breaking
the network, whereas network monitoring usually only requires the controller to un-
derstand the network device without the risk of breaking the network. And because
network configuration is so hard, it has lead to stagnation in the networks where
network administrators are reluctant to change and evolve the networks as changes
might break them. The virtualization technologies and the added network nodes
that they bring have reached the limit where static networks are no longer an option
and the advent of new network paradigms SDN and NFV has started an effort to
make the networks more automated and configurable.
A modern approach for making network management, especially network config-
uration, more manageable was presented in this thesis. This approach consisted of
the YANG data modelling language and the NETCONF network configuration pro-
tocol. YANG offers globally established interfaces to manage networks which would
greatly reduce the complexity of network management since everybody would ad-
here to the same rules. Modelling network functions with YANG was shown in this
thesis to be a straight forward process that is rather simple and powerful, although
requiring collaboration to produce good abstractions for the modelled functional-
ity. YANG alone, even without NETCONF, offers huge possibilities to advance the
current disordered state of network configuration by introducing open standardized
interfaces and is arguably more important of the two. On the other hand, NET-
CONF introduces a secure and reliable protocol that offers many advances, such as
scalability improvements, over its predecessor SNMP. Whilst NETCONF is built on
YANG models, it offers on top of YANG its own new standardized way to configure
and monitor network devices that is, as show in the thesis, easy to integrate with
existing network devices.
This new network management solution presents opportunities for open source
communities and proprietary vendors alike. These opportunities promote collabora-
tion and interoperability that benefit all included parties. In addition, this solution
offers a smooth transition, which is really important for network infrastructure, from
the old stagnated networks to a more dynamic future proposed by SDN and NFV.
The biggest threat that this solution is susceptible to is that if the development of
new YANG models stagnates before the major network functionalities are modelled,
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it will prevent many of the presented opportunities from becoming reality.
It is clear that there is a need for automated network management solutions in the
future and the network management solution offered by YANG and NETCONF is a
very viable candidate. And if these automated network management solutions start
to get traction then maybe we might see automated, widely deployed and reliable
network management in the 2020s.
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APPENDIX A
YANG Data Model for IPsec Protocols
module ipsec {
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ipsec";
prefix ipsec;
import ietf-inet-types {
prefix inet;
}
import ietf-netconf-acm {
prefix nacm;
}
import ietf-interfaces {
prefix if;
}
import ietf-ip {
prefix ip;
}
import ipsec-types {
prefix ipsec-types;
}
import keys {
prefix keys;
}
organization
"Insta DefSec Oy
Sarankulmankatu 20
33901 Tampere,
Finland";
contact
"Joonas Ruohonen <joonas.ruohonen@insta.fi>";
description
"This YANG module defines essential components for the management
of a ipsec subsystem.
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to
the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License set
forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust’s Legal Provisions
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Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see the
RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision 2015-08-23 {
description
"Initial revision.";
reference "RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for IPsec Management";
}
feature tunnel-auto-negotiation {
description
"Indicates support for starting IKEv2 negotiations
automatically without any traffic flowing through the
gateway. This lowers the connection startup times, but
also increases the processing load on the network.";
}
feature certificate-revocation {
description
"Indicates support for certificate revocation lists.
Revocation list’s location will be read from the CA
certificates.";
}
feature extra-revocation-server {
description
"Indicates support for defining additional CRL servers
in the configuration.";
}
feature dead-peer-detection {
description
"Indicates support for DPD functionality which tries
to resolve if a peer has died after configured amount of
idle time.";
}
feature interface-selector {
description
"Indicates support for interface restrictions in traffic
selectors.";
}
typedef manual-policy-ref {
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description
"Reference to manual security association that can be
used to for example identify the SA that requires reloading.";
type leafref {
path "/ipsec:ipsec/ipsec:manual-policies/ipsec:manual-policy/ipsec:name";
}
}
typedef dynamic-policy-ref {
description
"Reference to IKEv2 security association that can be
used to for example identify the SA that requires reloading.";
type leafref {
path "/ipsec:ipsec/ipsec:dynamic-policies/ipsec:dynamic-policy/ipsec:name";
}
}
grouping gateway-addresses {
description
"Defines the IP addresses that are used for IKEv2 and IPsec
traffic.";
choice address-family {
description
"Addresses can be either both IPv4 or both IPv6 but not mixed.";
container ipv4 {
leaf local-ip {
description
"Reference to locally configured interface’s IP where this
security association’s gateway address is located.";
type leafref {
path "/if:interfaces/if:interface/ip:ipv4/ip:address/ip:ip";
}
mandatory true;
}
leaf remote-ip {
description
"IP address of the remote peer.";
type inet:ipv4-address;
}
}
container ipv6 {
leaf local-ip {
description
"Reference to locally configured interface’s IP where this
security association’s gateway address is located.";
type leafref {
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path "/if:interfaces/if:interface/ip:ipv6/ip:address/ip:ip";
}
mandatory true;
}
leaf remote-ip {
description
"IP address of the remote peer.";
type inet:ipv6-address;
}
}
}
}
grouping gateway-identity {
description
"A gateway can be identified with a IP address or
FQDN which maps to the certificate provided by the peer.";
choice identity {
leaf ipv4-address {
type inet:ipv4-address;
}
leaf ipv6-address {
type inet:ipv6-address;
}
leaf fqdn {
type ipsec-types:fqdn;
}
}
}
grouping gateway-identities {
description
"A gateway can own multiple identities and thus
those can be configured using local-id. If no local-id
is defined, the local-ip assumed as the identity.";
container local-id {
uses gateway-identity;
}
container remote-id {
uses gateway-identity;
}
}
grouping selectors {
description
"A rule contains one-to-one mapping between two
networks that are connected by the IPsec tunnel.
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The rule can be tightened by defining the allowed
protocol and possibly the allowed port also.
Multiple rules combined form a security association
between peers and share keys. Rules are always one-way.";
choice address-family {
description
"Addresses can be either both IPv4 or both IPv6 but not mixed.";
container ipv4 {
container sources {
list source {
description
"Defines the source network and possibly port where from
the traffic is allowed to flow through the tunnel.";
key "ip";
max-elements 16;
leaf protocol {
description
"Defines the layer 4 protocol that is to be matched
with this rule.";
type identityref {
base ipsec-types:protocol-type;
}
default "ipsec-types:any";
}
leaf ip {
type inet:ipv4-prefix;
mandatory true;
}
leaf port {
description
"Only the protocols which utilize ports allowed.";
when
"../protocol=’tcp’ or
../protocol=’udp’ or
../protocol=’sctp’";
type inet:port-number;
}
}
}
container destinations {
list destination {
description
"Defines the destination network and possibly port where to
the traffic is allowed to flow through the tunnel.";
key "ip";
max-elements 16;
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leaf protocol {
description
"Defines the layer 4 protocol that is to be matched
with this rule.";
type identityref {
base ipsec-types:protocol-type;
}
default "ipsec-types:any";
}
leaf ip {
type inet:ipv4-prefix;
mandatory true;
}
leaf port {
description
"Only the protocols which utilize ports allowed.";
when
"../protocol=’tcp’ or
../protocol=’udp’ or
../protocol=’sctp’";
type inet:port-number;
}
}
}
}
container ipv6 {
container sources {
list source {
description
"Defines the source network and possibly port where from
the traffic is allowed to flow through the tunnel.";
key "ip";
max-elements 16;
leaf protocol {
description
"Defines the layer 4 protocol that is to be matched
with this rule.";
type identityref {
base ipsec-types:protocol-type;
}
default "ipsec-types:any";
}
leaf ip {
type inet:ipv6-prefix;
mandatory true;
}
leaf port {
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description
"Only the protocols which utilize ports allowed.";
when
"../protocol=’tcp’ or
../protocol=’udp’ or
../protocol=’sctp’";
type inet:port-number;
}
}
}
container destinations {
list destination {
description
"Defines the destination network and possibly port where to
the traffic is allowed to flow through the tunnel.";
key "ip";
max-elements 16;
leaf protocol {
description
"Defines the layer 4 protocol that is to be matched
with this rule.";
type identityref {
base ipsec-types:protocol-type;
}
default "ipsec-types:any";
}
leaf ip {
type inet:ipv6-prefix;
mandatory true;
}
leaf port {
description
"Only the protocols which utilize ports allowed.";
when
"../protocol=’tcp’ or
../protocol=’udp’ or
../protocol=’sctp’";
type inet:port-number;
}
}
}
}
}
}
container ipsec {
leaf active {
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type boolean;
}
container dead-peer-detection {
if-feature dead-peer-detection;
leaf enabled {
type boolean;
default "false";
}
leaf timeout {
type uint16;
units "seconds";
default "3600";
}
leaf retry-limit {
type uint8;
default "5";
}
leaf retry-timer {
type uint16;
units "milliseconds";
default "500";
}
leaf retry-timer-max {
type uint16;
units "milliseconds";
default "3000";
}
}
container certificate-revocation {
if-feature certificate-revocation;
leaf enabled {
type boolean;
default "true";
}
leaf search-limit {
type uint8;
default "5";
}
leaf search-timer {
type uint16;
units "seconds";
default "20";
}
container servers {
list server {
key "host";
leaf host {
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type inet:host;
}
leaf port {
type inet:port-number;
default "389";
}
leaf protocol {
type identityref {
base ipsec-types:protocol-type;
}
default "ipsec-types:ldap";
}
}
}
}
container manual-policies {
list manual-policy {
key "name";
leaf name {
type string;
}
leaf direction {
type identityref {
base ipsec-types:direction-type;
}
mandatory true;
}
leaf mode {
type identityref {
base ipsec-types:mode-type;
}
}
leaf encapsulation {
type identityref {
base ipsec-types:encapsulation-type;
}
}
uses gateway-addresses;
leaf spi {
type uint32;
mandatory true;
}
container authentication {
when
"../encapsulation=’esp’ or
../encapsulation=’ah’";
leaf algorithm {
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type identityref {
base ipsec-types:authentication-type;
}
mandatory true;
}
leaf key {
type keys:preshared-key-ref;
mandatory true;
}
}
container encryption {
when "../encapsulation=’esp’";
leaf algorithm {
type identityref {
base ipsec-types:encryption-type;
}
mandatory true;
}
leaf key {
type keys:preshared-key-ref;
mandatory true;
}
}
}
}
container dynamic-policies {
list dynamic-policy {
key "name";
leaf name {
type string;
}
leaf mode {
type identityref {
base ipsec-types:mode-type;
}
}
leaf active {
type boolean;
default "true";
}
leaf auto-negotiate {
if-feature tunnel-auto-negotiation;
type boolean;
default "false";
}
leaf use-crl {
if-feature certificate-revocation;
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type boolean;
default "true";
}
leaf lifetime {
type uint32;
units "seconds";
default "7200";
}
uses gateway-addresses;
uses gateway-identities;
choice authentication {
mandatory true;
leaf preshared-key {
type keys:preshared-key-ref;
}
container public-key {
leaf private-key {
type keys:private-key-ref;
mandatory true;
}
leaf public-key {
type keys:certificate-ref;
mandatory true;
}
container certificate-authorities {
leaf-list certificate-authority {
type keys:certificate-authority-ref;
min-elements 1;
}
}
}
}
container algorithms {
leaf-list authentication {
type identityref {
base ipsec-types:authentication-type;
}
min-elements 1;
}
leaf-list encryption {
type identityref {
base ipsec-types:encryption-type;
}
min-elements 1;
}
leaf-list prf {
type identityref {
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base ipsec-types:authentication-type;
}
min-elements 1;
}
leaf-list dh-group {
type identityref {
base ipsec-types:dh-group-type;
}
min-elements 1;
}
}
container transforms {
leaf encapsulation {
type identityref {
base ipsec-types:encapsulation-type;
}
}
leaf lifetime {
type uint32;
units "seconds";
default "3600";
}
leaf lifebytes {
type uint32;
units "bytes";
default "500000000";
}
container algorithms {
leaf-list authentication {
type identityref {
base ipsec-types:authentication-type;
}
min-elements 1;
}
leaf-list encryption {
type identityref {
base ipsec-types:encryption-type;
}
min-elements 1;
}
leaf-list dh-group {
type identityref {
base ipsec-types:dh-group-type;
}
min-elements 1;
}
}
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}
}
}
container rules {
list rule {
key "name";
ordered-by "user";
leaf name {
type string;
}
leaf action {
type identityref {
base ipsec-types:action-type;
}
mandatory true;
}
leaf direction {
type identityref {
base ipsec-types:direction-type;
}
mandatory true;
}
leaf interface {
if-feature interface-selector;
description
"...";
type leafref {
path "/if:interfaces/if:interface/if:name";
}
}
choice security-association {
when "../action=’encapsulate’";
leaf manual-policy {
type manual-policy-ref;
}
leaf dynamic-policy {
type dynamic-policy-ref;
}
}
uses selectors;
}
}
}
rpc activate {
nacm:default-deny-all;
input {
leaf dynamic-policy {
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type dynamic-policy-ref;
}
}
}
rpc reset {
nacm:default-deny-all;
}
}
